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Abstract 
This paper combines establishment level production data with international trade data by port to 
examine the impact of accession to the EEC on the spatial distribution of UK manufacturing. We use 
this data to test the predictions from economic geography models of how external trade affects the 
spatial distribution of employment. Our results suggest that accession changed the country-
composition of UK trade and via the port-composition induced an exogenous shock to the economic 
environment in different locations. In line with theory, we find that better access to export markets 
and intermediate goods increase employment while increased import competition decreases 
employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Work in international trade has long been concerned with what is produced where. That is, in the 
distribution of economic activity across countries. In contrast, this paper forms part of a small, but 
growing literature focusing on the relationship between economic integration and the spatial distribution 
of economic activities within a country. We view UK accession to the European Economic Community as 
a trade “shock” and use this shock to help identify how trade affects the spatial distribution of activity. 
 
The UK’s accession to the EEC is a good case study for assessing these trade effects. First, as discussed 
below, that the UK would join was far from certain until less than a year before accession. This means 
that we can expect firm responses to come after UK accession even if firms are forward looking. Second, 
accession occurred when tariffs, generally, were at much higher levels than today. The fact that tariff 
reductions were large means that impacts should be easier to identify. Third, these tariff changes affected 
most manufacturing sectors at a time when manufacturing was a significant component of the UK 
economy. As most studies, ours included, focus exclusively on manufacturing, the relative importance of 
this sector will matter for the magnitude of any general equilibrium effects of liberalisation. Fourth, we 
are able to use detailed data on individual firms and the ports through which trade flows. This allows us to 
test the predictions from economic geography models in an original fashion. Finally, the existing 
literature focuses on the response of developing countries to major trade liberalisations. See, for example, 
Hanson (1996, 1997, 1998), Pavcnik (2002) and Tybout (2000, 2001). Studying developed countries, 
however, has one key advantage over looking at developing countries. Frequently, developing country 
liberalisations form part of a larger package in response to macroeconomic shocks. In contrast, although 
the early 1970s was a time of significant macroeconomic shocks, accession was not a response to these 
shocks. Thus, we can treat accession as providing a natural experiment in terms of changing trade policy. 
 
The fact that UK accession to the EEC led to a significant re-orientation of trade towards EEC members 
is well documented elsewhere - see, among many others, Winters (1984), or Begg et al (2003). Less well 
known, is the significant re-orientation in terms of the port through which this trade occurred. We 
describe this re-orientation in Overman and Winters (2005). In this paper, we argue that because this 
changing port-composition was a result of accession it induced different exogenous shocks to the 
economic environment in different UK regions. We then examine whether the resulting changes to the 
spatial distribution of employment are in line with predictions from models of economic geography. To 
do this, we construct a panel of firms for which we know production sector, employment and the Travel 
To Work Area (TTWA) where these firms are located. We use data on the volume of trade by port and 
distance from these ports to different TTWAs to construct measures of the import competition and access 
to export markets and intermediate goods faced by firms. Using the panel nature of our data to control for 
unobserved firm specific effects, we then test whether these three access variables have a significant 
impact on firm employment. Of course, it is possible that changes in firm employment actually drive 
changes in these variables rather than vice-versa. We argue, however, that the changing country 
composition of UK trade during this period is driven by accession, not the performance of individual 
firms and so we can use this changing country composition to instrument for the three access variables. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the historical background 
and details the extent of trade liberalisation that occurred when the UK joined the EEC. Section 3 
considers theoretical predictions about the possible impact of integration on the spatial distribution of 
activity. Section 4 details the trade and production data that we use. Section 5 constructs measures of 
import competition, export market access and intermediate good market access and analyses whether 
these have the predicted impact on firm employment. Section 6 looks at the extent to which changes in 
the port composition of trade are determined by the country composition of trade. Section 7 then uses   3
these findings to construct instruments for the port composition of trade and thus assess whether the 
effects that we document in section 5 are actually due to the trade liberalisation associated with accession. 
Section 8 concludes. 
2. The background 
 
The UK first applied to join the EEC in 1961. This application, and a second in 1967, failed as a result of 
a French veto. A third application was successful and the UK joined on 1
st January 1973. For our 
purposes, it is interesting to note that even without the French veto, UK membership was far from certain. 
Edward Heath’s narrow majority of 30 was sufficient to ensure that parliament accepted the government’s 
accession terms, but the signing of the Treaty of Accession was a much closer run thing. In the end, the 
government carried the day with a majority of 21. As suggested above, this uncertainty ensures that 
adjustment to accession is likely to have occurred after entry rather than before, even if firms are forward 
looking. Moreover, once the need for adjustment has been identified, it is likely to take a while to effect, 
so we should observe the impact in our data (which start from 1970). 
 
Table 1: Major Economic Events 1970s 
 
Year Month  Event 
1971  February  Decimal currency introduced 
  August  End of Bretton Woods era; Pound allowed to float 
1972  January  Miners begin pay strike 
  February  3 day working week begins for most industry to conserve power supplies; miners 
return to work 
  May  Sterling joins the EEC currency snake 
  June  Sterling out of the snake 
  November  Counter inflation bill – 90 day standstill pay, prices, rents, dividends 
1973  January  UK joins EEC; further controls on prices, pay, rents, dividends 
  March  Pay Board and Price Commission established 
  May  1.6m workers strike against counter-inflation measures 
  October  66% price increase light crude oil 
  November  25% cut in oil supplies to West; voltage reductions due to power engineers 
industrial action; petrol ration coupons issued 
1974  January  Light crude oil price from $5 to $11.5 per barrel; 3 day working week 
 February  Miners  strike 
  March  End of miners strike and return to 5 day working week 
  May  Lifting of restrictions on fuel 
  July  TUC accept voluntary wage restraint in place of statutory wage controls 
1975  August  £6 per week pay rise limit becomes effective 
 October  OPEC  10%  price  increase 
  July  Heavy selling of sterling 
1976  September  Treasury announces it will seek $3.9bn loan from IMF 
  January  Further $3bn loan from Bank of International Settlements 
1977  July  Abolition of tariffs with EFTA 
  December  OPEC announces new 14.5% (staggered) price increases 
1978  January  “Winter of Discontent” – series of strikes in public services 
1979  May  Price Commission abolished 
  June  OPEC announce 15% price increase 
 
Notes: The timeline is an extract from that available at http://www.bized.ac.uk   4
 
While this uncertainty works in our favour, other macroeconomic uncertainties of the time do not. A 
number of these uncertainties were global, some were UK specific. Table 1 provides a timeline of major 
events. These events are likely to have an impact on the composition of overall economic activity. 
However, our focus is on the impact that integration has on the spatial distribution of economic activity in 
different sectors within the UK taking the level of aggregate sectoral activity as given. It is still possible 
that these shocks could account for what we observe, but only if they affect locations asymmetrically in a 
way that is correlated with the trade shocks we identify. Given their macro-economic nature, this seems 
unlikely, but clearly the possibility cannot be completely ruled out. 
 
We finish this brief background review with a note on the changes in tariffs associated with accession. In 
the early 1970s tariffs were considerably higher than now, so that the margins of preference generated by 
accession were, in some cases, quite large. Table 2 reports average UK and EEC tariffs after the Kennedy 
Round – i.e. applicable from 1972 to 1980 when the Tokyo Round started. In 1972 UK imports from 
outside the Commonwealth and manufactured imports from EFTA faced the tariffs reported in the ‘UK’ 
column, with a mean of 7.2% but entries as high as 19%. By 1979 all except those from the EEC, EFTA 
(manufactures) and the ACP developing countries faced the tariffs in the ‘EEC’ column, with mean of 
4.2% and peaks of 14%. The excepted countries faced zero tariffs broadly speaking. 
 
Table 2: UK/EEC Tariff rates 1972-1979 
 
Product  UK EEC   UK  EEC 
Mineral products  0.2 0.1  Footwear and headwear  14.7 12.4
Chemical products  8.1 6.9  Stone, ceramic and glass products  10.2 8.0
Rubber products  7.4 2.0  Base metals and metal products  5.2 4.2
Hides, furs, leather products  4.6 1.3 Unwrought, pig iron, scrap  1.1 2.0
Raw hides, skins, fur  N/A N/A Basic shapes and forms  8.9 7.0
Articles of leather, fur  13.1 1.3 Steel 9.2 6.7
Wood and cork products  2.3 1.1 Other  7.5 8.7
Wood, natural cork  0.5 0.1 Articles of base metal, misc.  10.0 7.1
Articles of wood, cork  6.8 9.4  Nonelectrical machinery  8.6 6.4
Pulp and paper  7.8 6.9  Electrical machinery  12.4 9.1
Pulp 0.1 2.5  Transportation  equipment  9.8 9.3
Paper 13.1 11.1  Precision  instruments  13.5 8.4
Textiles 9.1 4.7  Miscellaneous  4.2 2.4
Natural fiber and waste  N/A 0.2      
Yarn and basic fabrics  15.0 11.1   
Special fabrics, apparel, other  19.0 13.9
 Total  7.2 4.9
 
Notes: N/A denotes figures not available in the original source. Source: Preeg (1970).  
3. Theory 
 
What should we expect to be the impact of accession on the spatial distribution of economic activity in 
the UK? Obviously, theories of comparative advantage help us to understand the changing composition 
across sectors, and this must play a part in the overall decline in UK manufacturing during this period. It 
could also clearly help us to understand changes in the distribution of aggregate activity if regions are 
specialised in sectors that perform differently as the UK adjusts to accession. However, our focus is on 
how integration affects the spatial distribution of activity within particular sectors, on which theories of   5
comparative advantage are essentially silent. Thus the theoretical foundation that we use comes from the 
literature that directly considers the impact that integration has on economic geography. These effects 
have been the focus of the recent ‘New Economic Geography’ (NEG) associated with urban and 
international economists, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Fujita and Thisse (2002), and 
Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, Robert-Nicoud (2003) for overviews. The analysis of NEG 
formalises ideas about the impact of trade from an older literature associated with economic geographers. 
 
This literature argues that the equilibrium spatial distribution of economic activity depends on the balance 
between agglomeration and dispersion forces. Firms that locate in big markets benefit from being close to 
their customers and suppliers. That is, they benefit from demand and supply linkages. Offsetting these 
advantages is the fact that big markets are more crowded which increases product and factor market 
competition putting downward pressure on prices and upward pressure on wages.
1 The balance of these 
forces depends on the trade costs between different locations. At higher trade costs, the costs of serving 
distant customers are so large that they dominate the agglomeration forces and activity is dispersed. At 
intermediate trade costs, the opposite is true and agglomeration can occur, while at low trade costs, 
congestion costs are dominant and industry may once again disperse. 
 
What do such models imply for the economic geography of the UK as it opens up to trade with Europe? 
One possibility is that regions that are close to new trading partners (i.e. “border” regions), benefit 
disproportionately from the improved market access that comes with accession. Hanson (1996, 1997, 
1998) has used regional data from Mexico to test whether changing export market access helps explain 
the changing economic geography of Mexican regions. He argues that the formation of NAFTA acts as a 
natural experiment that disproportionately increases the export market access of regions in the north of 
the country close to the US border. His empirical work tests the prediction that this change should lead 
activity to relocate from Mexico City to the northern regions driving up employment and wages there. 
Both of these predictions hold true.
2 
 
The effect found by Hanson is not the only possibility when a country opens up to trade. While export 
market access and access to imported intermediate goods rises in border regions, so too does the degree of 
product market competition felt via imports. Hanson focuses only on export market access and thus 
argues that the employment share of border regions must rise. Once we allow for increased import 
competition, border regions may suffer if activity relocates from those border regions to other non-border 
regions. This happens because firms in non-border regions are partly protected from increased 
competition by the fact that imports incur higher transport costs to reach those regions. This line of 
reasoning has been formalised by Alonso-Villar (2001), Monfort and Nicolini (2000), Paluzie (2001) and 
Crozet and Koenig (2002). Brulhart and Koenig (2005) provide related empirical evidence for quite 
aggregate sectoral data (the 8 sectors of 1 digit NACE) for the CEEC countries. 
 
When we turn to our empirical analysis we view ports as identifying the borders of the UK (i.e. the points 
through which imports enter and exports leave). We then construct variables that capture all three access 
effects. We expect activity to rise with better export market access and access to intermediate goods and 
to fall with increased import competition. The reduced form relationship we estimate is close to, but not 
exactly, that which could be derived from extending the formal models mentioned above to allow for 
multiple sectors. As data limitations prevent us from estimating a more structural equation, we see little to 
be gained from working through a more formal model. Instead, we motivate our approach on the basis of 
                                                 
1 In NEG models that rely on Dixit-Stiglitz production functions this is technically a market crowding effect and not a product 
market competition effect. See Ottavianno and Thisse (2003) for further discussion. 
2 Hanson’s results may also be influenced by the general, non-discriminatory, liberalisation in Mexico which Krugman and 
Livas (1996) argue should reduce the attractions of the metropolis – Mexico City – relative to other locations.   6
the informal reasoning and the intuitive predictions that we have drawn out above and refer the interested 




4.1 Production data  
 
Our basic unit of observation will be the employment of UK manufacturing establishments for the period 
1970-1992 constructed using production data from the Annual Respondent Database (ARD).
3 The ARD 
is an extremely rich data set which contains information about all UK manufacturing establishments.
4 
Griffith (1999) provides a detailed description of this data.  
 
Establishments provide data on a range of variables, although the data available on any particular 
establishment in any given year depends on whether it was selected to make a detailed return that year. 
Selected establishments answer a detailed questionnaire providing data on a range of variables. In contrast 
data for non-selected establishments is much more basic. As a general rule all larger establishments with 
more than 100 employees are selected, as are a percentage of establishments with more than 20 but less 
than 100 employees. Establishments with less than 20 employees are usually exempt (non-selected). The 
precise rules vary year by year. Table A1 in the Appendix provides details of the sample selection criteria 
for all years between 1970 and 1992.  
 
For our analysis we work with employment data, rather than wages, because we are confident that 
employment variables are constructed in a consistent way across time.
5 We then need to decide which of 
two possible variables to work with. One possibility is the estimate of employment that is used when 
deciding which establishments are selected to return a full questionnaire.
6 Somewhat confusingly, the 
ARD refers to this as selected employment. Selected employment should be recorded whether or not an 
establishment makes a full return (given that it forms the basis for deciding which establishments have to 
make such a return). Although this is true from 1980-1992, it is not so in the 1970’s where employment 
has been collected, but (accidentally) deleted for non-selected establishments. As a result, we choose only 
to work with returned employment. For an establishment to be in our sample, we must have returned 
employment for at least two years during our sample period.
7 Given the sampling frame discussed above, 
this means that our sample will be composed of a disproportionate number of larger establishments. 
Below, we present robustness checks that show that this sample selection does not affect our results. 
 
                                                 
3 The availability of trade data restricts us to only study 1970-1992. We discuss this below. 
4 For legal reasons, we exclude Northern Ireland. The smallest unit of observation in the ARD is the local unit (‘plants’). Local 
unit data is not available for the 1970s. In addition, allocating plants to the regions that we use, Travel To Work Areas 
(TTWA), would be a huge undertaking. Instead we use data for reporting units (‘establishments’). Reporting units may consist 
of several local units. The calculation of access variables is problematic for reporting units with local units in different 
locations. Given the data problems discussed above, we proceed by assigning all employment to the reporting unit, ignoring 
redistribution across local units. If anything, this means that we understate the impact of accession if re-allocation across local 
units is affected in the same way as that across reporting units. Fortunately data from 1997 (when the ARD provides TTWA 
for local units) show this problem only affects a small percentage (3% in 1997) of reporting units because less than 10% of 
them have multiple local units and less than a third of these then have local units in different TTWAs. Reporting units may also 
be part of a larger enterprise group but we ignore any correlation for units that are part of the same group.  
5 In the terminology of Head and Mayer (2004a) we consider the quantity version of the market size and product competition 
effects rather than the price (or wage) version. 
6 This employment data is obtained from the various predecessors to the Inter Departmental Business Register and the data 
may have come from a return to another survey or an administrative source such as VAT or PAYE. 
7 We need at least two years to estimate firm specific fixed effects. We also only consider firms that do not change sector.   7
Given that our unit of observation will be employment by establishment, we need to be able to classify 
establishments by activity and location. All establishments are classified according to their main 
economic activity using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). During our sample period, the SIC 
changes from SIC 1968 revision (SIC68) to SIC 1980 revision (SIC80). A preliminary mapping from 
SIC80 to SIC68 was provided by the ONS and then supplemented using ARD data on individual 
establishments’ sectoral classifications. For compatibility with the trade data, we then map from SIC68 to 
the Industry/Commodity group classification used in the 1974 IO table (IO sectors). IO sectors are 
basically defined at, or are aggregations of, 3-digit SIC68 sectors (minimum list headings). Details of the 
mappings from SIC80 to SIC68 to IO sectors are available from the authors on request. The list of the 80 
IO sectors that we work with in the econometric section are given in table A2 of the Appendix. 
 
Establishments can be located using a number of indicators. All establishments can be located in one of 
10 UK regions. However, to analyse the impact of integration, we wanted to use a smaller geographical 
scale that would hopefully provide more cross-section and time series variation with which to identify the 
effects. After much experimentation, we constructed a consistent set of geographical units across our time 
period based on 307 UK Travel To Work Areas (TTWA 1998 revision). Allocating establishments to 
TTWAs is complicated because the location information provided in the ARD varies significantly over 
time. The three most important sources of location information are the establishment’s local employment 
office, local authority and postcode. Local employment codes are provided at the start of our time period 
but not the end. The timing is reversed for postcode. Again, detailed information on how establishments 
are located is available on request.  
 
One issue for estimation arises from the need to reconstruct establishment TTWA from a variety of 
location variables that are not perfectly nested: Sometimes, establishments close to the boundaries of 
TTWA may change TTWA even though the establishment has not relocated. Given this, we do not 
explicitly model establishment re-locations, instead assuming the same establishment level fixed effect 
independent of any relocation. For establishments that change TTWA due to the imperfect mapping of 
location variables to TTWA this introduces some noise in the measurement of the access variables, but 
should not affect results otherwise. Genuine moves should not affect our results either, unless they are 
driven by changes to establishment fixed effects that are systematically related to the choice of new 
location (and hence the measure of access variables). This seems unlikely. Similarly, although we allow 
for establishment births and deaths (i.e. the panel is unbalanced) we do not explicitly model the extent to 
which accession changed birth and death rates across TTWA. 
  
4.2 The International trade data
8  
 
The main international trade data that underpin our analysis describe UK trade by port and commodity 
from 1970 to 1992.
9 The dataset was specially constructed from official sources for the present exercise 
and, to our knowledge, these sources have never been exploited before at this level of detail. They were 
supplemented by data for the same commodities and time period on the sources of imports and 
destination of exports, which reflect the re-orientation of UK trade following accession to the EEC. 
 
Data on UK trade by port have been published in a variety of sources since 1970.
10 The source data 
contain three major omissions: export data for 1983, both export and import data for 1987, and export 
                                                 
8 Some of the material in this sub-section is taken from section 4 of Overman and Winters (2005).  
9 Data are not available by port for trade with the EU after 1992 because under the Single Market Programme these flows were 
treated as internal European trade and were recorded via VAT returns rather than by Customs and Excise at the port. 
10 The Annual Statement of Trade, Vol. V, (HM Customs and Excise), 1970-75; Statistics of Trade through United Kingdom 
Ports, (HM Customs and Excise), 1976-80; on micro fiche, 1981-87, and then electronically for 1988-92 via the commercial 
data suppliers, Business Trade Statistics Ltd.   8
data for HS chapters 84-99 for 1989-90. The structure of the data varies by publication and the 
classifications evolve from SITC(R) through SITC(2R) and (3R) to the Harmonised System (HS, 1988).
11 
We have attempted to correct for these evolutions and to convert the data to a common classification. The 
latter process requires some approximation, usually based on the structure of UK total trade.  
 
The most disaggregated continuous series that could be constructed was at the Division (2-digit) level of 
the SITC(R), which distinguishes 56 headings, of which we have to drop one (35, gas and electricity) and 
combine one pair into a single heading (33 and 52 which become entwined in the later classifications). At 
this level no volume or deflator data are available, so all data are in value terms. Given the high rates of 
inflation over much of the period this renders inter-temporal absolute comparisons meaningless, but for 
our purposes using ports’ shares in total UK trade of a commodity is sufficient.  
 
Over the period 1970-92 data are reported for about 120 ports at some point of time. However, the 
coverage changes through time and there is a fairly continuous process of re-combination of ports into 
local groups, as the geographical responsibilities of individual customs offices evolved. In most cases we 
solve these problems by aggregating ports into groups that are invariant over time, but there remain a 
number of minor inconsistencies.
12 We do not believe that we have introduced any major errors, however. 
Overall we are able to compile consistent data on 92 ports or local groups of ports over 1970-92.
13 
 
When we turn to the econometric specifications, it is sometimes useful to group ports into eleven groups, 
loosely based on those used by Chisholm (1992, 1995) in the only previous analysis we know of that 
considers the effects of accession on the geography of trade (but not production). The eleven groups, 
along with the acronyms that we use to refer to them, are defined in table A3 of the appendix. The 
grouping is more finely disaggregated around the South East, because we expect integration to affect 
those ports in particular.
14  
 
4.3  Mapping Trade Flows to Industries 
 
The data on trade flows prior to 1977 are available only at Division (2-digit) level of the SITC(R). Thus 
all subsequent data were converted to this basis. To relate these data to manufacturing establishments we 
need to develop a concordance between SITC(R) and UK IO sectors. No such converters were published, 
so we had to proceed indirectly. Aki Kuwahara of UNCTAD kindly supplied us with a ‘universal’ 
concordance between eight classifications including the SITC(R) and the International SIC68 from which 
we generated a mapping from the approximately 1,200 basic SITC(R) 4- and 5-digit headings to 4-digit 
ISIC headings, of which there are one hundred of relevance for trade in goods. 
 
This mapping was then matched to UK visible export data by SITC(R) collected from the UN Comtrade 
Database,
15 averaged over 1970-80. In about a dozen cases an SITC heading was mapped to more than 
one ISIC heading, in which case trade was divided evenly between those headings. In about three dozen 
                                                 
11 In addition to classifying goods differently, the classifications also have different coverage of goods. E.g. variations in the 
treatment of non-monetary gold, tax-free cars, and parcel post. 
12 E.g. Avonmouth was included in Bristol 1970-73, the two ports were separated for 1974-80 and after 1980 Bristol 
disappears as an explicit entry and we take it implicitly to be included in Avonmouth. 
13 The data have been subject to a number of consistency checks as they have been prepared, including checking against 
independent sources. Unfortunately a small number of implausibilities remain in the allocation of trade across ports. The most 
serious remaining mystery is the sharp changes in the share of exports of engineering goods (SITC(R)7) passing through 
Heathrow in 1991. We have been unable to explain this or to find a plausible way of adjusting the data. 
14 We separate London from THAKE and Felixstowe from HAVEA because the two named ports are major specialist deep-sea 
ports which may have different trading roles from their regional neighbours. We do not treat Southampton specially, because it 
entirely dominates its region, nor Liverpool, because we are less interested in the North-West region a priori. 
15 For which, thanks are due to Azita Amjadi of the World Bank.   9
cases an SITC heading had not been mapped to ISIC. Most of these were UN ‘special’ 4-digit codes 
ending in zero which are used when official statisticians cannot allocate trade across 4-digit headings but 
know its 3-digit category. Most of these actually recorded no trade for the UK, and so allocating them to 
ISIC did not matter, but this was not always the case. In addition, there were about half a dozen ‘genuine’ 




The dataset resulting from these manipulations comprised about 1,200 rows each containing an ISIC 
heading, a SITC(R) heading and an export flow. This was then aggregated into SITC(R) 2-digit divisions 
and then into the ISIC headings to create a matrix of trade cross-classified by ISIC and SITC(R) sections. 
From this the converter matrix B
x was created by dividing entries by their column sums. Thus B
x reports 
how exports of an SITC section flow are derived from ISIC 4-digit headings. A corresponding matrix was 
created for imports, B
M, using UK imports data from the same source averaged over 1970-80. 
 
Department of Industry (1980) defines UK Input-Output (IO) sectors in terms of the minimum list 
headings (MLH) of the UK’s SIC68. There are 91 sectors which potentially could produce tradable 
goods. CSO (1971) concords the MLHs with ISIC 4-digit categories, noting the many places in which the 
concordance is less than perfect. Most of these are small enough to ignore or are neutralised when MLHs 
are aggregated into IO-sectors. Thus the mapping normally maps the whole of an ISIC heading into a 
single IO-sector. However, thirteen major conflicts between ISIC and SIC are explicitly listed in the 
introduction to CSO(1971);
17 these were treated individually wherever possible, as were the 26 cases in 
which an ISIC heading is mapped to more than one IO-sector. In these cases, we reverted to the SITC(R) 
4- and 5-digit trade data to divide the ISIC trade aggregate appropriately between IO-sectors, completing 
separate exercises for exports and imports. The resulting matrices, C
X and C
M, report how trade flows by 
ISIC heading may be allocated across IO-sectors. Once the classification matrices have been derived we 
apply them to the data on SITC(R) Division trade by port to create series of trade by port, IO sector and 
year, which we can marry with the establishment data. 
5. Import competition, access to export markets and the changing economic 
geography of UK manufacturing 
 
In an earlier paper (Overman and Winters, 2005), we describe the way that accession re-orientated UK 
trade towards ports that were close to EEC member countries. Re-orientation did not occur uniformly 
across sectors. Some sectors showed particularly strong re-orientation while the effect in others was 
weaker or even went in the opposite direction. In this paper, we use this cross-sector variation to examine 
whether accession helps to explain changes to the economic geography of UK manufacturing. The 
hypotheses that we investigate are (i) accession re-oriented UK trade by country of origin/destination and 
that this caused a re-orientation in terms of the ports used for that trade; (ii) that this changed the degree 
of import competition, and the ease of access to intermediate goods and export markets faced by 
establishments in different TTWAs; (iii) these changes in turn affected the economic geography of 
manufacturing. We proceed in several stages. First, in this section, we describe how we calculate import 
competition, access to intermediate goods and export market access for TTWAs. We then show that 
changes in these measures are correlated with changes in establishment employment in a way that is 
consistent with theory. In the following two sections, we then consider issues of causality.  
 
                                                 
16 Finally, two SITC headings were mapped to a ‘false’ ISIC heading, 9999; that is, for these headings there is no 
corresponding ISIC heading at all. This ‘false’ heading was treated symmetrically with genuine ISIC headings. 
17 This is in addition to a general note about the different treatment of repair work in the two classifications, which we cannot 
make allowance for.   10
Our dependent variable is establishment employment. We know the industrial sector of the establishment 
and in which TTWA they are located for the time that the establishment exists during the period 1970-
1992.
18 We want to explain the evolution in establishment employment in terms of import competition, 
access to intermediate goods and export markets. We start by using the port trade data to construct 
proxies for these three access variables.  
 
Although we have trade data by ports, we do not have information on the UK origin of exports and the 
UK destination of imports. One possibility is to assume that imports and exports occur only through the 
closest port. That is, assume that ports have well defined ‘hinterlands’ and ‘forelands’. Evidence 
presented in Hoare (1977, 1985, 1986, 1988) and Chisholm (1992) argues against this. Chisholm reports 
Hoare’s results as showing that “if we take the standard region as the geographical unit of analysis, then 
in 1964, the tonnage of [firm] exports routed through a port in the same standard region accounted for 
63% of the total; by 1978 the proportion had fallen to 48%” [Chisholm 1992, p563]. Chisholm’s results 
suggest that “the rapid reduction in the strength of local linkages seems to have abated in the period 1978-
86” [Chisholm 1992, p563]. Given that on average establishments are not only linked to their closest port 
we instead assume that distance from all ports and the volume of trade through those ports are the key 
determinants of the access variables. Thus, we assume that establishments in TTWAs that are close to 
ports with large amounts of imports face more import competition than those in TTWAs a long way from 
these ports. Similarly for intermediate goods and export market access.  
 
It is important to note that such a formulation is consistent with NEG theory where love of variety means 
that consumers purchase all varieties of differentiated manufactured goods, while establishments supply 
their differentiated goods to all markets. Given that different ports tend to trade with different foreign 
markets (something we consider empirically below), the idea that distance to all ports matters is 
consistent with the underlying theory. 
 
Using this assumption, we construct a measure of import competition faced by an establishment in a 








where mjpt is the share of imports for sector j coming in through port p at time t and dlp is the distance in 
kilometres between port p and TTWA l. To implement this equation, we map trade flows to IO sectors as 
described in section 4.3. Distance are calculated as straight line distances using data on the eastings and 
northings of the port and the centre of the TTWA. For the moment, we weight port trade flows by the 
simple inverse of distance, but we discuss other alternatives in section 7.2 below. 
 








using the share of exports (xjpt) that leave the UK through each port. To calculate intermediate market 
access we weight the imports in different sectors coming in at each port by industries use of that sectors 








where ajk is industry j’s use of intermediate k.
19 
                                                 
18 As discussed in the data section, we only consider firms that do not change TTWA or IO sector during the life of the firm. 
19 Industry j’s use of intermediate k is taken from Department of Industry (1980).   11
 
Using these measures of import competition, intermediate good and export market access, we run the 
following regression for each sector for the panel of employment by establishment.  
 
it i jlt j jlt j jlt j j it c INT EXP IMP e ε β β β β + + + + + = ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 3 2 1 0  
 
where  eit is employment in establishment i,  ci  is an establishment specific fixed effect, εit  is an 
idiosyncratic shock; IMPjlt is the measure of import competition for sector j (the main economic activity 
of establishment i) in TTWA l (where establishment i is located) at time t, with intermediate good and 
export market access defined similarly. The betas are coefficients to be estimated. We estimate the 
specification by sector (so that coefficients vary across sector) using data from 1970 to 1992. We exclude 
data from 1983 (no export data) and 1987 (no export or import data). We include, but do not report results 
for, a set of year dummies. Theory predicts a negative coefficient on import competition ( 0 1 < i β ), and 
positive coefficients on intermediate good and export market access ( 0 2 > i β  and  0 3 > i β ).  
 
A few comments are in order. First, we observe no additional information at the establishment level so all 
we can do is use the panel dimension of our data to control for the unobserved establishment specific 
fixed effect. Second, the only explanatory variables we can measure at the TTWA level over this period 
are the access variables included in the specification. Third, the flow of trade through different ports may 
be partly driven by changes in the spatial distribution of UK manufacturing. To control for these 
problems we will present instrumental variable results in section 7, once we have considered the extent to 
which the direction of trade determines the port composition. Instrumenting controls for the problem of 
the endogeneity of the included TTWA variables. Providing that other TTWA level or establishment level 
variables are uncorrelated with the country re-orientation of trade (which seems reasonable) this should 
also control for other omitted variables that might be correlated with the access variables.  
 
For the moment, table 3 reports results from estimating the specification using the within estimator, 
ignoring these three problems.
20 We get the clearest results on export market access. 21 coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 5% level or higher, with only 10 negative and significant and the rest 
insignificant. Results on import competition and intermediate good access are more mixed. For import 
competition, 16 coefficients are negative and significant in line with theory, while 13 are significantly 
positive. For intermediate access, 16 coefficients are positive, in line with theory with 12 negative. Part of 
the problem here is that the diagonal coefficients on the input output table are often large at the two digit 
level so these two variables are quite highly correlated. On balance, we would argue that our initial results 
are more with the theory than against it, but we postpone further discussion until we have dealt with the 
three problems highlighted above. This is the issue to which we now turn using the fact that UK accession 
acts as a natural experiment which changes the direction of trade independent of changes to UK economic 
geography and thus provides a way to construct a variable to instrument the economic geography 
variables. Details of how we construct the instrument are given in section 6, while section 7 considers 
results when we use these instruments in our basic panel specification. 
 
                                                 
20 There are insufficient observations for sector 61 (other vehicles). No industry is classified in sector 74 (textile finishing). It is 
not clear why this is the case, but this is true in the raw data and is not a result of our processing of the data.   12
Table 3: Estimates of effect of economic geography variables on establishment employment 
 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.18  0.36  -0.14 40   50  0.31 -0.19  0.06 215
11 0.49*  0.15**  -0.55**  130   51  -0.20** 0.14*  0.10 926
12 -0.20*  0.02  0.17* 149   52 16.04** 1.73**  -18.06** 223
13 0.03  0.03  -0.06  1258   53  0.61** 0.06  -0.70** 308
14 -0.71**  0.09  0.72** 1031   54  -0.72** 0.21*  0.67** 529
15 -0.09  0.04  0.16  512   55  -0.11 0.04  0.12 252
16 -4.33  0.30**  4.23 39   56  0.00 0.12 -0.07 746
17 -0.01  -0.13**  0.02  215   57  -0.18** 0.31** -0.04 825
18 -0.01  -0.12**  0.23**  375   58  0.13 -0.03  0.32 59
19 -0.01  -0.04  0.10  121   59  0.00 -0.13**  0.06 1529
20 0.34**  0.06  -0.31** 798  60  -0.01 0.08  -0.03 579
21 0.00  0.09  0.07  326   62 -0.04 0.04 0.00 1083
22 0.04  -0.10**  0.22**  337   63 -0.40 0.18* 0.26 492
23 0.50**  -0.18*  -0.35**  32  64 -0.53** 0.25* 0.42** 321
24 0.03  0.12**  0.04  609   65  0.03 0.02 0.06 348
25 -0.08  0.10  0.04  290   66  0.26* -0.23*  0.13 138
26 0.09  -0.08  -0.08  161   67 0.06* 0.03  -0.05* 4840
27 0.02  0.01  0.01  213   68  0.00 0.09 -0.16 56
28 -0.38**  0.45**  0.27*  111   69  -0.76** 0.01  1.02** 713
29 0.12  -0.27**  0.21**  422   70  0.08 0.05  -0.21* 808
30 -0.25  -0.01  0.11 75   71  0.40 0.20* -0.36 1030
31 -0.07  0.19  -0.04 67   72  0.50* -0.08  -0.62** 166
32 -0.09  0.09  0.03  434   73  0.13 -0.19 -0.10 275
33 0.10*  0.12*  -0.07  673   75 -0.33* -0.31*  0.58** 165
34 0.07  0.03  0.00  751   76  0.03 0.04 -0.02 733
35 -0.35  0.00  0.64*  418   77 0.11** 0.00  -0.13** 3918
36 0.04  0.16**  -0.07  492   78 0.13* -0.02 -0.01 535
37 0.45* 0.01 0.03  229   79  -0.12 0.20**  -0.10 437
38 0.02  -0.11  0.17  628   80  -0.13* 0.13* 0.13 679
39 -0.10*  0.04  0.09* 591   81  -0.01 -0.17  -0.27 31
40 -0.75**  0.14  0.85**  97   82  -0.04 -0.01  0.11** 1353
41 -0.22  0.53**  -0.23  244   83  -0.06 0.09*  0.07** 1650
42 0.02  -0.11*  0.08  877   84  0.50 -0.02 -0.46 3220
43 0.97  0.10  -1.27  102   85  0.65 0.22** -0.82 324
44 -0.09**  0.01  0.05 2269   86  -0.13 0.04  0.12 843
45 -0.10**  0.24** -0.08* 1770   87  -0.08 0.02  0.02 830
46 0.01  -0.05  0.09**  2347   88  0.04 -0.09** 0.00 4979
47 -0.19**  0.20**  0.04 1655   89  0.00 0.07  0.00 535
48 0.04  0.00  -0.11**  941   90 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 2155
49 -0.30*  0.80**  -0.16** 171   91  0.10* -0.12  -0.01 1323
 
Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. N gives the number of unique establishments used to calculate 
the within estimator. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All specifications include establishment fixed effects 
and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987). Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and 
trade data described in Section 4. 
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6. Explaining the Port-Composition of UK Trade 
 
Our basic hypothesis assumes that the direction of trade partly determines the port-composition of trade 
and that the direction of trade is exogenously shifted by UK accession. This section considers this 
hypothesis, first for the sake of its intrinsic interest, but second in order to use the direction of trade as an 
instrument for the port-composition in our estimating equation. We are not arguing that direction is the 
only factor behind the port-composition of trade. Clearly factors such as port-facilities, internal 
transportation links and traditional shipping lines also matter. However, even the most casual reflection 
on shipping routes suggests the likelihood of some link – for example, roll-on, roll-off ferries for France 
leave mainly from South-East England, while those for Ireland leave from equivalent facilities in Wales, 
North-West England and West Scotland. 
 
We explore the substantive question using data for 11 port-regions and 54 commodities.
21 The hypothesis 
concerns the ‘behaviour’ of ports and hence we treat ports as the basic observational units and estimate, 
for each, a panel of 54 commodities with 21 years of data for exports and 22 for imports. We are 
interested in the shares of each commodity entering/leaving via specific ports which is convenient, since 
by converting everything to shares we avoid the need to allow for inflation. 
 
The basic equation is: 
∑ =
D
d gdt pd pgt T b S  
where subscripts are p for port group, g for commodity, t for time and d (d=1,…,D) for destination of 
exports (or source for imports). S is the share of the port group p in total trade in good g in year t, and T 
the share of destination d in that trade. Because the shares sum to unity over d (i.e.  1 = ∑d gdt T , all g and 
t), the equation is rewritten in the form: 
gD
D
d gDt gdt pd pgt b T T b S + − =∑
−1
) (  
where D refers to the D
th destination. Further, because the shares all sum to unity over ports ( 1 = ∑ p pgt S , 
all g and t), the  gd b  sum to zero over p and the  gD b to unity. Provided that all equations contain the same 
regressors and no observations are omitted, these conditions are automatically satisfied by linear 
regressions run on each port separately. In addition we include a time trend in the equations to capture 
slowly evolving factors affecting ports (allowed to vary over port-regions and over commodities), and a 
dummy variable taking the value of unity from 1980 onwards to represent the abolition of the National 
Docks Labour Scheme. This highly restrictive labour agreement applied in around half of UK ports, and 
is widely regarded as having curtailed their productivity and growth relative to non-Scheme ports. The 
coefficients of these variables also sum to zero over port groups.  
 
We are interested in trade with Western Europe as a factor in UK economic geography, and also note that 
for very distant partners (e.g. China) the choice of UK port is likely to depend very little, if at all, on its 
closeness to that partner. Hence given the likely difficulties of identifying very many country effects, we 
distinguish the following countries, or groups of countries as sources for imports and markets for exports: 
France; Germany; Benelux ;Scandinavia; Italy; Austria and Switzerland; Other Western Europe, and Rest 
of the World (which is the omitted category, D, in the estimating equation above.)
22 Given that our 
                                                 
21 Given that we do not have a full model of the port composition of trade we do not try to explain the small number of zero-
flows for regions. Rather we take them as data, omitting them from the sample, and omitting all observations for a region-
commodity pair if it can muster fewer than five observations exceeding 0.000001 over the sample period. 
22 Trade data aim to identify the ultimate destination of exports and the actual producer of imports rather than country to or 
from which they are immediately transported. Thus some trade recorded as bound to or from a country may actually travel via 
European entrepôts, (e.g. Rotterdam or Antwerp) and hence all trade may have a bias towards South-East ports. This could   14
sample ends in 1992, trade with the Soviet bloc was very small so we do not break it out separately. Thus 
our working hypothesis is that while Europe is sufficiently close to the UK that it could be of material 
importance which UK ports were used for trading with it, the rest of the world is sufficiently distant that 
port choice will hardly be influenced by the geographical composition of trade within the bloc. 
 
Table 4 presents two sets of results for exports and imports of manufactures (SITC 5 – 8).
23 For each port 
group we report the coefficients of interest, the probability levels for Wald tests of the null hypothesis that 
the country breakdown explains none of the port-composition of trade, the within-R
2 for the panels 
(across commodities) and the sample size. The time trend terms are frequently statistically significant 
individually and always strongly so collectively. The fit is mostly quite high and the direction of trade 
variables are often highly significant although not always entirely in line with our maintained hypothesis 
about the European bias of the Southern and Eastern ports. This is not surprising given the complexity of 
logistical optimisation. Nonetheless, the overall results are quite strongly supportive of the model.  
 
The results are reported with the ports ordered according to the extent to which we expect the port to be 
tied to European trade.
24 The constant, also labelled RW to remind us of its role as the comparator region 
(D) in the equation, is difficult to interpret because the RW data also appears in all the other independent 
data. The remaining country coefficients describe the effects on a port-region’s share of exports of a 
commodity of an increase in the share of that country accompanied by an equal fall in the share of the 
RW in exports of the commodity. 
 
Starting at the far right of table 4, it is plain that the Thames and Kent region is strongly, positively 
influenced by trade with France. Germany is important for exports, not imports (vice-versa for Italy) 
Correspondingly, it has a bias against trade with Scandinavia and Other Western Europe. London, in 
contrast, shows much less dependence on neighbouring European markets, presumably reflecting its 
traditions as a national deep-sea port. It has a strong trend decline in importance (not reported in the table) 
even allowing for its ‘unfavourable’ country profile. Haven/East Anglia shows less response to French, 
German and Italian trade and more to Scandinavian trade (i.e. its focus is more north-easterly, like its 
location). Felixstowe, which is reputedly more international than the rest of its region, nonetheless shows 
strong connections to Scandinavia. 
 
Moving south-westwards, Sussex and Hampshire shows positive effects for France and Belgium. For the 
South-South West and Cornwall, North East and East Scotland, results are somewhat mixed. The rest of 
ports region – the whole of Britain’s west coast – shows the predicted (relative) negative dependence on 
North West European trade (with surprise positives for Benelux manufactured trade) and positive effects 
from Other Western Europe and the Rest of the World. Air transportation may also experience some of 
the geographical influences we postulate and the results of the combined tests on direction suggest that 
this is so. However, the individual coefficients do not lend themselves to easy interpretation. 
 
This discussion leaves the strong impression that the country-composition of trade does have a role in 
explaining its port composition. The degrees of explanation are quite high, given the simplicity of the 
model, and the statistical tests quite clear in their inference. It is also notable that, as predicted, the 
precision with which the effects can be identified declines as we move away from the South East. We do 
not advance these results as a comprehensive theory of port-use, but they are quite sufficient to suggest 
the plausibility of our hypothesis and the use of country-composition as instruments for port composition. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
slightly distort our estimates but does not overturn the basic idea that as trade with Western Europe increases, ports in the 
South and East are likely to benefit most. 
23 Results for primary exports and imports (SITC 0 – 4) are available on request. 
24 Thus the first column refers to ‘other airports’, which are scattered about the country, the second to the London airports 
(Heathrow, Gatwick and Southend) and the remainder to sea ports roughly in order of increasing proximity to Western Europe.   15
Table 4: The Port Composition of Trade given the Country Composition 
 
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS                             
   AIROT  AIRLO  RESTP  ESCOT  NEHUM  SSWCO  SUHAM FELIX HAVEA LONDN THAKE 
Dock Labour  -0.01**  0.01  -0.01*  0.00  0.01**  0.00  -0.03**  0.01**  0.01**  0.02**  -0.01** 
France    -0.11**  0.10 -0.42** -0.04**  0.38**  0.04  0.02  -0.04  0.00  -0.29**  0.36** 
Germany    0.04  0.09 -0.14 -0.03 -0.03  0.03 -0.05  -0.12**  0.04  -0.17  0.34** 
Benelux    -0.03  -0.29** 0.25** 0.04**  0.01  0.04*  -0.05  -0.01  -0.05  0.09  0.01 
Italy    -0.14*  0.46** 0.12 0.03  -0.23*  -0.13** 0.01  -0.17*  -0.01  0.05 0.01 
Scandinavia   0.09**  0.04  -0.29**  0.02  0.07  0.06*  0.03  0.21**  0.09  -0.04  -0.27** 
Oth. W. Eur.  0.10  -1.08**  0.59**  -0.01  0.00  -0.05  0.06  -0.07  0.06  0.83**  -0.43** 
Austria/Switz 0.02  0.69**  -0.12**  -0.01  -0.10** 0.01  -0.03 0.02  -0.08**  -0.45** 0.04 
Constant  RW  0.01 0.17** 0.19** 0.01** 0.15**  0.01 0.08**  0.01 0.09**  0.12** 0.18** 
R
2  (within)  0.28 0.59 0.81 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.82 0.59  0.81 0.91 
p(direcn  =  0)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
N  564 567 567 567 567 554 567 567 567  567 567 
                
MANUFACTURED IMPORTS                  
   AIROT  AIRLO  RESTP  ESCOT  NEHUM  SSWCO SUHAM  FELIX HAVEA  LONDN THAKE 
Dock Labour  -0.01**  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.01**  0.01**  -0.04**  0.02**  0.01**  0.01*  0.01 
France   -0.09**  -0.05  -0.19**  -0.05  0.04  -0.02  0.28**  -0.16**  0.17**  -0.22**  0.30** 
Germany   0.00  -0.16**  -0.06  0.02  0.04  -0.01  0.03  0.00  -0.05  0.12*  0.06 
Benelux   0.01  -0.11  0.15**  -0.09**  -0.09**  -0.03  0.12**  0.00  0.04  -0.08  0.08 
Italy   -0.03  0.02  -0.13*  0.02  -0.09*  0.18**  -0.13  -0.09  -0.21  -0.12  0.58** 
Scandinavia   0.00  -0.42**  0.03  -0.06*  0.09**  -0.05**  -0.09  0.26**  0.28**  0.28**  -0.31** 
Oth.  W.  Eur. 0.10*  -0.03 0.14 0.02 -0.07  -0.01 0.01 0.04  -0.01  0.07  -0.27** 
Austria/Switz 0.01  0.82**  -0.03  0.08** 0.05  -0.02  -0.19**  -0.09*  -0.12**  -0.18**  -0.34** 
Constant RW  0.05**  0.18**  0.09**  0.00  0.10**  0.03**  0.10**  0.09**  0.12**  0.04**  0.20** 
R
2  (within)  0.32 0.59 0.80 0.54 0.49 0.52 0.27 0.68 0.65  0.68 0.86 
p(direcn  =  0)  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
N  591 593 594 594 594 593 594 594 594  594 594 
Notes: Coefficients from regression of port regions shares on dummy for Dock Labour Scheme, country shares and time dummies (not 
reported); * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. R
2 (within) reports the within R-squared. p(direcn =0) reports the 
probability levels for Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the country breakdown explains none of the port-composition of trade. N 
reports the sample size. Source: Authors own calculations using trade data described in Section 4.  
Given this, we estimate the same model on the individual port data in order to generate instrumental 
estimates of exports and imports. The port data are noisier and subject to many more zeros and small 
values. For some ports we have too few observations to estimate a panel at all and for many we have to 
omit some commodities. As before, we take the zeros as exogenous to the country-composition of trade 
and estimate only on share observations exceeding 0.000001 (1/10,000
th of a percent) where there are at 
least five of them for a particular port/commodity combination over the sample. Some of the predicted 
values from these equations, the instrumental estimates, are negative, but they are very small and 
correspond to very small flows in the data. Thus, we carry them forward to the next stage. Before being 
used as instruments, the estimates are put through the SITC-IO converter, and many of them are absorbed 
into other positive values at this stage. Then, before use, the results by port are combined with distance 
data to calculate the distances of the TTWAs from the mean bundle of imports or exports, and at this 
stage they are entirely dominated by the larger positive values for the larger ports. From the results it is 
clear that the estimates for the larger individual ports are well defined and plausible (as for the regional 
data) so all told we do not believe that the negative predictions play any material role in the final results.   16
7. The UK’s accession to the EEC and the changing economic geography of UK 
manufacturing 
 
7.1 Instrumental variable results 
 
To construct our instruments, we simply replace actual port trade shares with predicted port trade shares 
when calculating our measures of import competition, intermediate good and export market access. Table 
5 presents results when we instrument all three access variables using these measures based on predicted 
shares and all other exogenous variables as instruments. Table 6 summarises these results in the row 
marked “core results”. It also provides, for comparison, results when we do not instrument as well as 
results for a number of robustness checks to which we will shortly turn. 
 
The instrumental variable results are actually more supportive of the theoretical priors. Once again, let us 
start by considering the coefficient on instrumented export market access. 24 coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 5% level, 11 are negative significant (compared to 21 positive and 10 negative without 
instrumenting). For import competition, 22 coefficients are now negative significant, in line with theory 
and only 9 positive significant (compared to 16 negative, 13 positive before instrumenting). Finally, for 
intermediate good access, 20 coefficients are now positive significant, in line with theory, while only 9 
are negative (compared to 16 positive, 12 negative before instrumenting).  
 
7.2 Robustness checks 
 
Before discussing our results further, we report a range of robustness checks. As the number of tables of 
estimated coefficients soon becomes overwhelming, table 6 reports results comparing the number of 
positive and negative coefficients that are significant, while the detailed tables are relegated to the 
appendix.  
 
The results in table 5 are based on reported (or “returned”) employment. As discussed in the data section 
this is only available if a establishment has been selected in a given year and so the sample tends to 
favour larger establishments. When an establishment is not selected, we only have estimated (or 
“selected”) employment that is used to decide whether a establishment has to make a return. Using both 
selected and returned employment significantly increases the number of firms (particularly small firms) 
that we are able to use to identify the effects but as table A4 and the third row of table 6 show, this does 
not change the core results.
25 Given this, and the fact that we have no selected employment in the 1970’s, 
we continue to restrict our attention to the set of firms for which we have returned (i.e. actual) rather than 
selected (i.e. estimated) employment. 
 
 
                                                 
25 To be precise, we know set establishment employment equal to returned employment when that is available and selected 
employment otherwise.   17
Table 5: Instrumental variable estimates of effect of economic geography variables on 
establishment employment 
 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.18  -0.25  0.41 40   50  0.26 -0.33  0.27 215
11 -1.76*  -0.45*  2.43** 130   51 -0.54** 0.25* 0.29** 926
12 -0.27  -0.05  0.31**  149   52  17.42** 1.72**  -19.45** 223
13 0.05  0.00  -0.05  1258   53  0.60 0.37 -0.99 308
14 -0.66*  0.12  0.65*  1030   54 -0.74** 0.27*  0.64 529
15 -0.15  0.23*  0.08  512   55 -0.25* 0.33* -0.07 252
16 3.29  0.56**  -3.84  39   56  0.00 0.09 -0.03 746
17 0.08  -0.25**  0.04  215   57  -0.50** 0.67** -0.17 825
18 -0.04  -0.19*  0.32**  375   58  -0.09 -0.12  1.61** 59
19 0.04  0.12  -0.09  121   59  0.06 -0.42**  0.35** 1529
20 -0.17  0.48**  -0.24*  798   60  -0.36 0.04  0.33 579
21 0.13  0.03  0.01  326   62 -0.08 0.16 -0.09 1083
22 -0.11  -0.07  0.27**  337   63  -0.23 0.62** -0.37 492
23 0.66**  -0.19*  -0.69**  32  64 -0.97** 0.35 0.84** 321
24 -0.12  0.18**  0.15  609   65  0.08 -0.15 0.23* 348
25 -0.06  0.04  0.10  290   66  0.44* -0.42*  0.37** 138
26 0.06  -0.07  -0.07  161   67  0.07 0.11*  -0.16** 4840
27 -0.25  -0.03  0.21  213   68  -0.05 0.16 -0.22 56
28 -0.50**  0.48**  0.38*  111   69  -1.50** -0.23  2.03** 713
29 -0.04  -0.24**  0.37**  422   70  0.44 -0.46 -0.16 808
30 -0.59  0.18  0.14 75   71  0.28 -0.30  0.25 1030
31 -0.06  0.08  0.09 67   72  0.41 -0.53 -0.15 166
32 0.03  -0.06  0.09  434   73 0.86* -0.50* -0.53 275
33 0.36** -0.06 -0.09 673  75  -0.61* -0.45* 1.00** 165
34 -0.07  0.25**  -0.09  751   76  0.02 0.02  0.01 733
35 0.06  -0.14  0.34  418   77  0.13** 0.02  -0.19** 3918
36 0.10  0.26*  -0.18  492   78  0.22** -0.12* 0.02 535
37 0.14  0.30  -0.08  229   79 -0.04 0.32* -0.25 437
38 -0.05  -0.09  0.23  628   80  -0.26** 0.25*  0.16 679
39 -0.22**  0.06  0.18*  591   81  -0.17 -0.19  -0.15 31
40 -0.69**  0.46  0.52  97   82  -0.04 -0.01  0.13** 1353
41 -1.67*  1.27**  0.15 244   83 -0.22** 0.26**  0.06 1650
42 0.01  -0.04  0.01  877   84  1.81** 0.06  -1.85** 3220
43 -0.51  -0.77  1.06  102   85  1.43 0.46**  -1.82* 324
44 -0.14**  -0.11  0.21** 2269   86  -0.55* 0.13*  0.47* 843
45 -0.31**  0.61**  -0.30** 1770   87  0.01 0.01  -0.06 830
46 -0.03  -0.20**  0.28**  2347   88  0.01 -0.06  0.00 4979
47 -0.23**  0.36**  -0.08 1655   89  -0.04 0.21*  -0.09 535
48 -0.20*  0.08 -0.03 941   90  -0.12* 0.06  -0.03 2155
49 -0.42*  1.04**  -0.30** 171   91  0.22* -0.22  -0.02 1323
 
Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. N gives the number of unique establishments used to calculate 
the within estimator. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All specifications include establishment fixed effects 
and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987).  
Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and trade data described in Section 4.   18
Table 6: Comparison of results from various specifications 
 
 Sign  IMP  EXP  INT  No.  IO 
+ 13 21 16 80  Core results (not 
instrumented) -  16 10 12  
+ 9 24 20 80  Core results (instrumented) 
-  22 11 9  
+ 13 28 21 80  Selected and returned 
employment -  24 12 15  
+ 8 24 24 80  Distance decay (ρ)=0.5 
-  25 91 1  
+ 7 21 18 80  Distance decay (ρ)=1.5 
-  16 81 2  
+ 10 25 21 80  INT defined ignoring own 
intermediates -  25 13 9  
+ 8 18 17 80  Heteroscedastic robust 
errors -  18 69 
+ 1 86 76  Clustered errors 
-  3 33 
+ 3 75 80  First differencing 
-  9 43 
+ 2 95 77  Long differences 
-  9 02 
 
Notes: The table reports the number of significant coefficients that are positive or negative in each of a variety of 
specifications. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market access and INT the 
coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. No. IO reports the number of sectors for which the specification has been run (we 
drop sectors with less than 10 unique observations) Bold text highlights the coefficients that are consistent with theory 
(negative for IMP; positive for EXP and INT). 
 
The next variation that we consider is to allow for different distance decay effects when constructing our 
measures of import competition, export market and intermediate good access. To see what this entails, 







IMP ρ ) (
 
where, as before, mjpt is the share of imports for sector j coming in through port p at time t and dlp is the 
distance in kilometres between port p and TTWA l. The coefficient ρ now allows us to vary the distance 
decay effect: the higher ρ the more import competition declines with distance from the port where the 
imports enter. The other two geography variables can be defined similarly. Ideally, we would like to be 
able to estimate the coefficient on distance using our data, but computational considerations make this 
infeasible.
26 Instead, we have experimented with two different values (ρ=0.5 and ρ=1.5) chosen after 
consulting Head and Disdier (2005) which provides a meta-analysis of results on the distance decay 
coefficient in the standard gravity model.
27 Detailed results are reported in tables A5 and A6 while, again, 
table 6 provides a summary. Results with a distance decay parameter of 0.5 are, if anything, a little 
stronger. Those with ρ  set equal to 1.5 are a little weaker, particularly for import competition and 
intermediate goods access. This is not particularly surprising, as ρ=1.5 is a fairly strong distance decay 
and gives much less time series variation from which to estimate the effects. Separating out the effects of 
                                                 
26 For 81 sectors, with 93 ports and 287 TTWAs each iteration requires a minimum of 3 x 2,161,971 calculations. 
27 In particular, examination of figure 1 suggests that these values are at roughly two standard deviations below and above the 
mean estimate.   19
import competition from intermediate good market access then becomes more difficult because large 




The existence of large diagonal elements in the input-output matrix suggests that we might be able to get 
stronger results if ignore own intermediate inputs when defining our measure of intermediate good access. 








where, as before, ajk is industry j’s use of intermediate k. Of course, this now means that the sign on the 
import competition variable could theoretically be positive if access to own intermediate goods is 
sufficiently important so as to outweigh the competition effect. This seems unlikely a priori, and the 
results reported in table A7 and summarised in table 6 show that the effect of the import competition 
variable is much as before. In fact, this redefinition of intermediate input access does little to change the 
results and so we pursue it no further. 
 
Two final issues before we turn to the interpretation of our core results. First, we examine what happens if 
we allow for a more general error structure on the idiosyncratic errors. Results reported in table A8 and 
summarised in table 6, show that little changes if we allow for arbitrary heteroscedasticity at the 
establishment level. Even more general, we could allow for the idiosyncratic errors of establishments in 
the same TTWA to be arbitrarily correlated. This is problematic in our context because, as dicussed in 
section 4, the way that we locate establishments means that they may shift around neighbouring TTWAs, 
while clustering the errors in the fixed effect regression requires us to restrict individual establishments to 
belong to only one cluster.
29 We could restrict attention to establishments that are only ever recorded in 
one TTWA, but this makes sample sizes too small in a number of industries (particularly as we also lose 
observations when only one establishment is present in a particular TTWA). Instead, to get some feeling 
for whether the pattern of results persists after clustering the errors we cluster establishments by their 
mode TTWA.
30 Given these sample size problems, we take the results reported in table A9 and 
summarised in table 6 as encouraging. Unsurprisingly we lose a few sectors and get less significant 
coefficients overall but the ratio of numbers of coefficients consistent with theory to those inconsistent 
with theory is almost identical to those of our core results. Given the smaller sample sizes and the 
conservative error structure one is tempted to look at coefficients that are significant at the 10% level in 
addition to 5% and above. This does not do much for the results on import competition and intermediate 
good access (we now find 6 import coefficients negative to 3 positive; 6 intermediate access coefficients 
positive to 4 negative). Results on export access are strengthened, however, with 12 coefficients now 
positive and 3 negative as before.  
 
As a final robustness check, we try an alternative estimation strategy switching from fixed effects 
estimation to time differencing. First differencing to remove the unobserved establishment specific effect 
results in significantly smaller sample sizes because we need establishments to report employment in at 
least two consecutive periods. Aside from the sampling frame, this condition has additional bite because 
we are missing two years of export data and one year of import data. On average, as table A10 shows, the 
instrumented first difference results are based on sample sizes that are 25% smaller than those presented 
in table 5 so, not unsurprisingly, we get less significant coefficients. However, as with other robustness 
checks, the overall pattern of the significant coefficients is roughly unchanged as table 6 shows. Again, 
                                                 
28 On a couple of occasions large coefficients on import competition are matched by equally large coefficients of opposite sign 
on intermediate good access suggesting this is a particular problem for that sector. See, e.g., sector 52 in table 4. 
29 See the implementation of clustered regressors in the stata module xtivreg2 for further discussion. 
30 We drop firms where there is more than one mode TTWA.   20
considering significance at 10% gives us slightly more theoretically consistent significant coefficients, 
particularly on intermediates where the number of positive significant coefficients increases by 5 (with 
only 1 additional negative) and exports where the overall number of positive significant coefficients is 12 
versus 7 negative. 
 
Instead of first differences, one particularly natural strategy is to restrict our focus to a long difference 
that defines pre-accession as the first period. The issue then is to choose the second period and hence the 
length of the difference. Attrition means that taking long differences across the whole of our time period 
is out of the question. An alternative which has a nice economic interpretation is to define a final period 
in the mid-1980s pre-single market.
31 Given that we do not have trade data for 1983, this suggests 
sometime 1984-1986. After investigating the possibilities, attrition coupled with the fact that all 
establishments are not sampled in a given year, forced us to take time averages for the 1970-72 period and 
1984-1986 period as our establishment level observations.
32 As table A11 shows the resulting sample 
sizes can still be quite small so again, unsurprisingly, the summary in table 6 shows that we have less 
significant coefficients overall. However, as with the clustered errors the ratio of numbers of coefficients 
consistent with theory to those inconsistent is, if anything, better than those of our core results. These 
ratios are virtually unchanged if we consider 10% significance levels. 
 
In summary, we have presented coefficients for a number of robustness checks that suggest that our core 
results are robust to different definitions of employment, to different distance decay coefficients; to 
alternative definitions of the access to intermediate goods and to allowing for arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
at the establishment level. The overall number of significant coefficients is smaller if we cluster errors at 
the TTWA (i.e. allow arbitrary correlation across establishments within the same TTWA) because of the 
problem of uniquely allocating firms to the same TTWA across time. First differencing and long 
differencing also give smaller numbers of coefficients but for a different reason – the much smaller 
sample sizes that are available for estimating these specifications. Despite these difficulties the ratio of 
coefficients consistent with theory to those inconsistent is, if anything, larger for these last three 
specifications. 
 
7.3 Discussion of results 
 
Overall, the series of checks that we have presented makes us confident that the core results that we 
presented in table 5 are fairly robust. Before concluding it is interesting to try to relate the pattern of 
coefficients across sectors to the characteristics of those sectors. To begin, we can consider how the 
pattern of coefficients relates to the changes in tariffs that occurred as a result of the UK’s accession to 
the EEC. We expect changes to UK tariffs to be one component determining the extent to which import 
competition changes as a result of UK accession. We can then get a rough measure of the extent of tariff 
changes that drive import competition by noting that internal EEC tariffs on most goods go to zero while 
UK tariffs remain in place from the rest of the world. Thus, the size of the UK tariffs on non-EEC 
countries give us some idea of the decrease in tariff experienced by the UK’s new EEC partners. We 
would expect this to be positively related to the increase in import competition in any given sector. 
Similarly, EEC tariffs will apply to non-EEC members post accession, but will no longer apply to the UK 
as a member of the EEC. Thus, the size of EEC tariffs give us some idea of the decrease in tariffs faced 
by UK exporters to the EEC and we would expect this to be positively associated with the change in 
export access experienced by a sector. 
 
                                                 
31 The Single European act was signed in 1986. 
32 We take the maximum of one, two or three year averages depending on the availability of data.   21
Clearly changing tariffs as the result of accession are one of several components that determine import 
competition and export market access, although other factors (such as trade-ability, which we consider 
below, will also matter). Referring back to the tariff information that we have available in table 2 it is 
obvious that we cannot do this in a particularly precise way because of the paucity of information on 
tariffs and the imperfect matching from available data on tariffs to sectors. We are able to match 64 
sectors in to the tariff data by excluding agricultural related sectors (IO 12-23) and four miscellaneous 
sectors (IO 83, 88, 90 & 91). The magnitude of the coefficients is not particularly informative, but we can 
try and relate the sign of significant coefficients to the change in import tariffs or the tariffs faced by 
exporters. For import competition, we have 26 coefficients which are significant and can be mapped to 
one of the tariffs reported in table 2. Of these, 19 are positive, 7 negative. Creating a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if the coefficient is positive and zero if negative, we then regress this dummy on the change 
in import tariffs. We can proceed similarly for the sign on export market access (reversing the coding of 
the dummy so that 1 always implies consistent with theory). Regressions of these two dummies on the 
changes in tariffs give positive, but insignificant coefficients and small R-squared. 
 
We do better if we try to relate the signs of coefficients to the openness of a sector. We rank sectors 
according to the direct exports of goods and services per mille of net output and, as before, define dummy 
variables for all three coefficients that take value 1 when the coefficient is consistent with theory, zero if 
inconsistent. The coefficient on openness for the import market dummy is positive, significant and the 
regression has an R-squared of 0.15. The coefficient on openness for the export access dummy is positive, 
but insignificant. The results for intermediates sit between these two extremes. Again, the coefficient on 
openness is positive, it is just insignificant (at 12%) and the overall R-squared is 0.08. 
 
Overall, the results here on the type of sectors that show effects consistent with theory are not particularly 
strong. However, many factors determine the way in which access variables change over this period for 
different sectors and nothing that we report here goes against our key finding that the signs of coefficients 
on the variables of interest are, on balance, broadly supportive of the theoretical priors. 
8. Conclusion 
 
This paper has offered a detailed investigation of the effects of the UK’s accession to the EEC on the 
spatial distribution of her industry. We are interested in this firstly per se but secondly as a test of the 
predictions of the ‘New Economic Geography’. We have undertaken two major data construction 
exercises, one on the employment and location of establishments and one on the allocation of UK 
international trade between British ports, to explore the question with a finer geographical and commodity 
disaggregation than ever before.  
 
To recap, UK accession changed the country composition of trade. These changes to the country 
composition of trade changed the ports through which trade entered and exited the UK with the result that 
import competition, export and intermediate market access changed differently for firms located in 
different TTWA. Firm employment responded to these changes in the way that theory predicts in roughly 
one quarter to one third of UK sectors. In a small number of sectors, the changes went against theory 
while for the remainder we can detect no significant effect. Attempting to explain which sectors were 
consistent with theory by looking at the changes in tariffs or the degree of openness does not provide a 
particularly strong story, but of course many other factors may have driven changes in access variables 
during this period.  
 
Our approach provides a new test of theories of economic geography that uses UK accession to help us 
identify the causal effect of changing import competition, export market access and intermediate good   22
market access on economic geography. Overall, we find that changes in the spatial distribution of UK 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Sampling frame for selected firms in ARD source data 1970-1992 






25 or more 
0 (exempt) 
All 
In some industries < 11 
In some industries 11 was lower limit 
1972-1977 <20 






50 or more 






In 68 industries 
In 68 industries 










In most industries 




















In most industries 




















In most industries 
In most industries 
All industries 
* In 1978 a small sample of establishments employing less than 20 was also drawn 
Source: Oulton (1997) and Barnes and Martin (2002)   25
Table A2: IO sectors 
Code Industry name  Code Industry name 
10 Coke ovens and manufactured fuel  51 Radio and electronics components 
11 Mineral oil refining, lubricating oils, etc.  52 Television, radio and sound reproducing equipment 
12 Grain milling  53 Electronic computers 
13 Bread and flour confectionery and biscuits  54 Radio, radar and electronic capital goods 
14 Meat and fish products  55 Domestic electrical appliances 
15 Milk and milk products  56 Other electrical goods 
16 Sugar  57 Shipbuilding and marine engineering 
17 Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery  58 Wheeled tractors 
18 Animal and poultry foods 59 Motor  vehicles 
19 Oils and fats  60 Aerospace equipment 
20 Other food  61 Other vehicles 
21 Soft drinks  62 Engineers' small tools 
22 Alcoholic drink  63 Cutlery etc., jewelry and precious metals 
23 Tobacco  64 Bolts, nuts, screws, etc. 
24 General chemicals  65 Wire and wire manufactures 
25 Pharmaceutical chemicals and preparations  66 Cans and metal boxes 
26 Toilet preparations  67 Other metal goods 
27 Paints  68 Production of man-made fibers 
28 Soap and detergents  69 Cotton, etc. spinning and weaving 
29 Synthetic resins, etc. and synthetic rubber  70 Woollen and worsted 
30 Dyestuffs and pigments  71 Hosiery and knitted goods 
31 Fertilizers  72 Carpets 
32 Other chemical industries  73 Household textiles and handkerchiefs 
33 Iron castings etc.  74 Textile finishing 
34 Other iron and steel  75 Other textiles 
35 Aluminum and aluminum alloys  76 Leather, leather goods and fur 
36 Other non-ferrous metals  77 Clothing 
37 Agricultural machinery  78 Footwear 
38 Machine tools  79 Bricks, fireclay and refractory goods 
39 Pumps, valves and compressors  80 Pottery and glass 
40 Industrial engines  81 Cement 
41 Textile machinery  82 Other building materials, etc. 
42 Construction and mechanical handling 
equipment 
83 Furniture and bedding, etc. 
43 Office machinery  84 Timber and miscellaneous wood manufactures 
44 Other non-electrical machinery  85 Paper and board 
45 Industrial plan and steelwork  86 Packaging products of paper, board, etc. 
46 Other mechanical engineering  87 Other paper and board products 
47 Instrument engineering  88 Printing and publishing 
48 Electrical machinery  89 Rubber 
49 Insulated wires and cables  90 Plastics products n.e.s. 
50 Telegraph and telephone equipment 91 Other  manufacturing   26
Table A3: Definition of port groups 
ALL OTHER AIRPORTS  ABERDEEN 
BELFAST AIRPORT  DUNDEE 
GLASGOW AIRPORT  FRASERBURGH 




PRESTWICK AIRPORT  KIRKCALDY 
GATWICK AIRPORT  KIRKWALL 
HEATHROW AIRPORT  LEITH 
AIRLO 
London 


















































Rest of ports 
WORKINGTON KINGS  LYNN 
LONDON  LONDON LOWESTOFT 
FELIX  FELIXSTOWE 
HAVEA 
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Table A4: Results using both selected and returned employment 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.13  -0.12  0.27 66   50  -0.36 0.16  0.04 1796
11 -0.34  -0.32*  0.85  493   51  -0.69** 0.44**  0.24** 5370
12 -0.22  -0.10  0.37**  483   52 8.07** 0.86**  -9.05** 2869
13 -0.10  0.23  -0.12  13020   53  -1.97** -0.27  2.08** 4249
14 -0.25  0.19  0.18  4606   54  -0.30 0.25*  0.12 3355
15 -0.29*  0.12  0.20  2514   55 -0.32** 0.41*  -0.05 2001
16 0.97  0.58**  -1.49  49   56 -0.01 0.16* -0.14 10421
17 0.12  -0.30**  0.08  1155   57  -0.42** 0.56**  -0.19** 25926
18 -0.01  -0.33**  0.35**  1519   58  -0.33 0.05 0.91* 155
19 0.02  0.20*  -0.16  472   59 0.14* 0.07 -0.16 7399
20 0.46*  -0.14  -0.27*  6514   60  -0.08 0.16*  -0.07 2445
21 -0.19  0.17*  0.10  993   62  -0.18 0.52**  -0.31** 5724
22 -0.21**  -0.01  0.23** 1152   63  2.77** 0.42** -3.19** 8824
23 0.57**  -0.26*  -0.61** 101  64  -0.42* -0.01 0.55** 2721
24 -0.04  0.18**  0.05  2738   65  0.15 -0.08  0.10 1395
25 -0.02  0.22**  -0.21  1254   66  0.32 -0.48**  0.44** 1477
26 0.39**  0.02  -0.42**  1046  67  0.09* 0.19** -0.23** 40679
27 -0.19  -0.15  0.25*  1121   68  -0.44 -1.02  1.17 81
28 -0.33*  0.36**  0.27* 757   69  -0.71* -0.18 1.15** 1719
29 0.06  -0.20*  0.23**  2378   70  0.91** -1.69**  0.61** 2678
30 -1.52**  0.99**  0.26  253   71  0.10 0.10  0.01 6104
31 0.06  0.31*  -0.21  397   72 -0.29 0.10 0.04 1496
32 -0.01  -0.06  0.11  2605   73  0.64 -0.09 -0.62 2030
33 -0.07*  0.57  -0.41*  1975   75  -0.20 -0.59** 0.77** 2719
34 -0.18  0.33**  -0.10  1802   76 0.23** -0.17 -0.06 6008
35 -0.11  -0.22**  0.51  1899   77 0.38** -0.04  -0.22** 40448
36 -0.01  0.29*  -0.14  1934   78  0.14 -0.22**  0.16 2886
37 0.19  -0.30  0.32**  3258   79 -0.09 0.15 -0.09 1396
38 -0.31**  -0.01  0.37** 7864   80  0.06 0.11  -0.08 5696
39 -0.18**  0.13  0.06 3410   81  -0.07 -0.45  0.05 548
40 -0.78**  -0.55  1.47** 1031   82  -0.11* 0.05  0.13** 5344
41 -1.53**  0.90**  0.44 1611   83  0.10* -0.06  0.06* 23402
42 0.06  -0.16*  0.13  5869   84  2.82** 0.14**  -2.90** 32357
43 1.85  0.83  -2.63  604   85  1.47 0.66** -2.03 1293
44 -0.12**  -0.01  0.09  11773   86  0.04 -0.04  0.05 4102
45 -0.22*  0.43**  -0.21**  10895   87  0.57 -0.07  -0.49 4548
46 -0.12**  -0.14**  0.31**  16238   88  0.05 -0.07  0.05** 69075
47 -0.12*  0.35**  -0.19*  10462   89 -0.23** 0.41**  -0.11 1862
48 -0.15*  0.40**  -0.31**  9349   90 -0.13** 0.03  0.01 14585
49 -0.41*  0.78**  -0.38**  1059   91  0.17** -0.08  -0.08 25334
Notes: The dependent variable is returned or selected employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, 
see table A2 in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on 
export market access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. N gives the number of unique establishments 
used to calculate the within estimator. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All specifications include 
establishment fixed effects and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987).  
Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and trade data described in Section 4.  28
Table A5: Results using distance decay ρ= 0.5 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.44  -1.25  1.46* 40   50  0.64 -0.76  0.78 215
11 -1.51  -0.31  2.39  130   51  -1.44** 0.67**  0.77** 926
12 -0.85  -0.09  0.80**  149   52  42.91** 3.91**  -48.43** 223
13 0.00  0.14  -0.16  1258   53 -1.78 0.56 0.99 308
14 -3.02**  0.00  3.22** 1031   54  -1.57* 0.84**  1.18 529
15 -0.13  0.60**  -0.15  512   55 -0.56* 0.92* -0.30 252
16 -10.24  0.74*  10.07  39   56  0.12 0.07  -0.02 746
17 0.02  -0.43**  0.14  215   57  -1.42** 1.75** -0.51 825
18 -0.19  -0.31  0.73**  375   58 -6.90* 4.38*  5.42** 59
19 0.15  0.26  -0.15  121   59  0.26 -0.90**  0.67* 1529
20 -0.58  1.00**  -0.23  798   60  -1.14 0.09  1.05 579
21 0.35  0.21  -0.12  326   62 -0.18 0.40 -0.23 1083
22 -0.27  -0.12  0.69**  337   63  -0.19 0.68** -0.36 492
23 1.70** -0.30  -2.15**  32  64 -1.95** 0.95 1.53** 321
24 0.03  0.37**  0.26  609   65  0.07 -0.08  0.55* 348
25 -0.27  0.28  0.16  290   66  1.17 -0.82 0.68* 138
26 0.02  -0.16  0.00  161   67 -0.02 0.41**  -0.36** 4840
27 -0.42  0.09  0.36  213   68  0.09 0.59 -1.05 56
28 -1.04**  1.30**  1.08*  111   69  -3.89** -0.44  5.22** 713
29 0.11  -1.06**  1.58**  422   70  1.30 -0.74  -1.05* 808
30 -1.70**  0.64  0.15  75   71  1.01 -0.33  -0.08 1030
31 -0.06  0.25  -0.04 67   72  0.89 1.43  -3.26** 166
32 0.19  -0.63*  0.68**  434   73  0.85 -1.11 -0.01 275
33 0.80* 0.06  -0.31  673   75  -1.89** -0.79  2.27** 165
34 0.09  0.57**  -0.28*  751   76  0.22 -0.43 0.17 733
35 0.73  -0.68*  0.45  418   77  0.52** -0.16  -0.59** 3918
36 0.31  0.57**  -0.38  492   78 0.41* -0.48** 0.20 535
37 0.23  1.05  -0.33  229   79  -0.54** 0.37 0.08 437
38 -0.30  -0.66*  1.21**  628   80  -0.53** 0.65**  0.19 679
39 -0.53**  0.00  0.56**  591   81  0.50 -0.50  -1.18 31
40 -1.38**  1.11  1.11  97   82  -0.18 0.00  0.42** 1353
41 -4.05*  4.25** -1.15 244   83 -0.82** 0.76** 0.26** 1650
42 0.02  -0.33  0.23  877   84  6.22** 0.11  -6.30** 3220
43 0.16  -1.11  0.32  102   85  9.76** 1.33**  -11.06** 324
44 -0.36**  -0.15  0.44* 2269   86  -2.16** 0.74**  1.54** 843
45 -1.06**  1.73**  -0.89** 1770   87  -1.86** 0.64**  1.20* 830
46 -0.06  -0.23  0.48**  2347   88  0.22 -0.37**  0.04 4979
47 -0.62**  0.94**  -0.19 1655   89  -0.22 0.33  0.05 535
48 -0.53**  0.34  -0.23  941   90  -0.27* 0.04  0.00 2155
49 -1.02**  2.31** -0.46*  171   91  0.56* -0.65*  0.09 1323
 
Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs (all calculated with distance coefficient ρ=0.5). N gives the 
number of unique establishments used to calculate the within estimator. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All 
specifications include establishment fixed effects and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987).  
Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and trade data described in Section 4.  29
Table A6: Results using distance decay ρ= 1.5 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.10  -0.09  0.20 40   50  0.30 -0.21  0.01 214
11 -0.99  -0.40  1.54*  129   51  -0.23 0.03  0.22** 926
12 -0.16  0.00  0.17**  149   52 5.10** 0.56*  -5.74** 223
13 0.02  0.02  -0.05  1243   53  0.01 0.21 -0.25 308
14 -0.16  0.14*  0.11  1027   54 -0.45* 0.14  0.40 529
15 -0.13  0.10*  0.10  512   55  -0.15 0.31* -0.17 252
16 3.52  0.18  -3.98  39   56  0.04 0.11  -0.13* 741
17 0.06  -0.18**  0.02  215   57  -0.23** 0.35** -0.10 822
18 -0.02  -0.10*  0.16**  372   58  1.40* -1.17*  0.70** 59
19 0.05  0.04  -0.08  121   59 -0.03 -0.22**  0.22** 1528
20 -0.12  0.35**  -0.19**  795   60  -0.20 0.04  0.17 579
21 0.08  0.01  0.01  324   62 -0.05 0.12*  -0.08* 1082
22 -0.06  -0.02  0.10*  335   63  -0.17 0.67** -0.51 491
23 0.36** -0.10  -0.26*  30  64 -0.90** 0.30** 0.71** 319
24 -0.16*  0.14**  0.12 608   65  0.14 -0.20  0.14* 348
25 0.05  0.02  -0.04  289   66  0.09 -0.12  0.18** 135
26 -0.04  0.01  0.01  161   67 0.09** 0.03  -0.11** 4832
27 -0.31  -0.04  0.28  212   68  -0.46 -0.26  0.74 56
28 -0.46**  0.21*  0.39**  111   69  -0.89** -0.13  1.19** 713
29 0.06  -0.10*  0.05  422   70  0.12 -0.16 -0.02 808
30 -0.15  -0.04  0.09 75   71  -0.41 -0.28 0.79* 1029
31 -0.08  0.08  0.08 67   72  0.24 -0.56**  0.16 166
32 -0.01  0.04  0.00  434   73 0.83** -0.15  -0.79** 275
33 0.11  -0.02  0.01  669   75 -0.25 -0.30**  0.54** 165
34 -0.12*  0.16* -0.01 751   76  0.03 0.10 -0.08* 731
35 0.11  -0.08  0.11  418   77 0.07* 0.01  -0.09** 3914
36 0.09  0.02  -0.03  492   78 0.15* -0.01 -0.07 534
37 -0.14  0.41*  -0.14  229   79 -0.38* 0.13  0.17 437
38 -0.03  0.08  0.00  627   80 -0.19* 0.12 0.16* 679
39 -0.17**  0.02  0.16**  587   81  -0.15 -0.17  0.03 31
40 -0.49**  0.41*  0.25  97   82  -0.07 0.07  0.05 1352
41 -0.70  0.58  0.07  244   83  -0.18** 0.23**  0.00 1650
42 -0.01  -0.02  0.03  877   84  0.67 0.02 -0.68 3220
43 0.22  -0.45  0.13  102   85  0.30 0.25** -0.53 321
44 -0.09**  -0.06  0.12** 2269   86  0.17 0.06  -0.20 837
45 -0.10  0.29**  -0.16**  1770   87  -0.08 0.07  0.01 821
46 -0.03  -0.13**  0.18**  2342   88  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 4964
47 -0.10*  0.17** -0.03  1655   89  -0.06 0.21** -0.12* 535
48 -0.22**  0.17*  -0.05  936   90  -0.08** 0.07  -0.05 2155
49 -0.19  0.69**  -0.32**  171   91  0.16 -0.12 -0.05 1323
Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs (all calculated with distance coefficient ρ=1.5). N gives the 
number of unique establishments used to calculate the within estimator. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All 
specifications include establishment fixed effects and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987).  
Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and trade data described in Section 4.  30
Table A7: Intermediate access variable constructed ignoring own intermediates 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.18  -0.25  0.41 40   50  0.27 -0.34  0.27 215
11 -1.72*  -0.45*  2.39** 130   51 -0.43** 0.28**  0.14* 926
12 -0.27  -0.05  0.31**  149   52  15.78** 1.73**  -17.83** 223
13 0.05  0.00  -0.05  1258   53  0.43 0.37* -0.82 308
14 -0.25**  0.07  0.30** 1030   54  -0.73** 0.26*  0.64 529
15 -0.09  0.27*  -0.04  512   55 -0.25* 0.32* -0.06 252
16 -0.45*  0.55** -0.08  39   56  0.00 0.08  -0.02 746
17 0.08  -0.25**  0.04  215   57  -0.51** 0.71**  -0.21* 825
18 -0.04  -0.19*  0.32**  375   58  0.03 -0.12  1.53** 59
19 0.02  0.13  -0.08  121   59  0.20** -0.39**  0.19* 1529
20 -0.22  0.47**  -0.18*  798   60  -0.11 0.05  0.06 579
21 0.13  0.04  0.00  326   62 -0.08 0.16 -0.09 1083
22 -0.11  -0.07  0.26**  337   63  -0.58** 0.66** -0.09 492
23 0.66**  -0.19*  -0.69**  32  64 -0.97** 0.35 0.84** 321
24 -0.08  0.15**  0.14  609   65  0.08 -0.15 0.22* 348
25 -0.02  0.10  -0.03  290   66  0.44* -0.42*  0.37** 138
26 0.06  -0.07  -0.07  161   67  0.06 0.11*  -0.16** 4840
27 -0.25  -0.03  0.21  213   68  -0.05 0.15 -0.21 56
28 -0.50**  0.48**  0.38*  111   69  -0.46** -0.22  0.98** 713
29 0.00  -0.24**  0.35**  422   70  0.44 -0.46 -0.15 808
30 -0.59  0.18  0.13 75   71  0.28 -0.30  0.25 1030
31 -0.06  0.08  0.09 67   72  0.41 -0.53 -0.15 166
32 0.04  -0.09  0.10  434   73 0.86* -0.50* -0.53 275
33 0.36** -0.06 -0.09 673  75  -0.50* -0.44* 0.89** 165
34 -0.09  0.25**  -0.07  751   76  0.03 0.02  0.00 733
35 0.17  -0.16*  0.27  418   77  0.12** 0.02  -0.17** 3918
36 -0.01  0.25*  -0.06  492   78 0.22** -0.12*  0.02 535
37 0.14  0.30  -0.08  229   79 -0.04 0.32* -0.25 437
38 -0.02  -0.10  0.20  628   80  -0.24** 0.23* 0.17* 679
39 -0.21**  0.06  0.16*  591   81  -0.17 -0.19  -0.15 31
40 -0.68**  0.46  0.51  97   82  -0.04 -0.01  0.12** 1353
41 -1.81**  1.25**  0.28  244   83  -0.22** 0.26**  0.06 1650
42 0.01  -0.04  0.01  877   84  0.09** 0.06  -0.13** 3220
43 -0.27  -0.72  0.77  102   85  -0.23** 0.47** -0.19 324
44 -0.09**  -0.12  0.17** 2269   86  -0.55* 0.13*  0.47* 843
45 -0.33**  0.62**  -0.29** 1770   87  0.01 0.01  -0.06 830
46 0.02  -0.22**  0.27**  2347   88  0.01 -0.06 0.00 4979
47 -0.26**  0.33**  -0.02 1655   89  -0.04 0.21*  -0.10 535
48 -0.22**  0.07  0.00  941   90  -0.12** 0.05  -0.03 2155
49 -0.42*  1.04**  -0.30** 171   91  0.26* -0.28*  0.02 1323
 Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. IMP and EXP constructed as for table 5. INT constructed 
ignoring own intermediates. N gives the number of unique establishments used to calculate the within estimator. * denotes 
significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All specifications include establishment fixed effects and time dummies. Data is for 
1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987). Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and trade data described in Section 
4.   31
Table A8: Robust errors 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.18  -0.25  0.41 39   50  0.26 -0.33  0.27 142
11 -1.81* -0.45  2.47* 114   51 -0.54** 0.25  0.29* 640
12 -0.27  -0.05  0.31**  119   52  17.43** 1.72**  -19.47** 146
13 0.07  0.01  -0.08  865   53  1.16 0.48*  -1.66* 194
14 -0.66  0.13  0.66  769   54  -0.73 0.27  0.63 393
15 -0.16  0.23*  0.09  390   55 -0.27* 0.38 -0.10 198
16 -3.59  0.67**  3.06 18   56  0.01 0.07 -0.01 526
17 0.08  -0.25**  0.03  175   57  -0.53** 0.70** -0.16 534
18 -0.02  -0.20*  0.33**  307   58  -0.09 -0.12  1.61** 42
19 0.04  0.13  -0.10  92   59  0.06 -0.42**  0.35* 1168
20 -0.17  0.48**  -0.24  571   60  -0.40 0.05  0.35 435
21 0.18  0.06  -0.08  254   62 -0.06 0.13 -0.07 820
22 -0.11  -0.07  0.27**  288   63  -0.23 0.63** -0.37 376
23 0.66** -0.19  -0.69**  25  64 -0.82** 0.29 0.73** 244
24 -0.09  0.19*  0.13  482   65  0.08 -0.15 0.23* 279
25 -0.09  0.03  0.17  204   66  0.44 -0.42  0.37** 106
26 0.06  -0.06  -0.08  123   67  0.07 0.11  -0.16** 3576
27 -0.26  -0.03  0.23  169   68  -0.03 0.16 -0.24 42
28 -0.50**  0.49**  0.38  87   69  -1.50** -0.23  2.02** 522
29 -0.04  -0.25*  0.39**  294   70  0.39 -0.39 -0.15 636
30 -0.67  0.20  0.17 65   71  0.31 -0.32  0.26 787
31 0.04  0.18  0.04  60   72  0.41 -0.53 -0.15 127
32 0.02  -0.04  0.09  334   73  0.86 -0.50* -0.53 193
33 0.36*  -0.06  -0.09  553   75 -0.62* -0.44  1.00** 128
34 -0.07  0.25**  -0.09  614   76  0.02 0.02  0.01 533
35 0.03  -0.18  0.44  299   77 0.13* 0.02  -0.18** 2771
36 0.11  0.25*  -0.18  398   78 0.22* -0.12 0.02 400
37 -0.11  0.35  -0.02  159   79  -0.04 0.35 -0.26 346
38 -0.05  -0.09  0.23  430   80  -0.26 0.28  0.11 482
39 -0.20**  0.06  0.16  466   81  -0.17 -0.18  -0.16 21
40 -0.69**  0.46  0.52  65   82  -0.05 0.00  0.13* 1028
41 -1.76  1.31**  0.17  190   83 -0.22* 0.25*  0.06 1183
42 0.01  -0.05  -0.01  651   84  1.86** 0.06  -1.89** 2066
43 -0.44  -0.76  0.98 68   85  1.55* 0.47**  -1.96* 260
44 -0.13**  -0.10  0.21* 1669   86  -0.67* 0.16*  0.57* 683
45 -0.31*  0.61**  -0.30**  1279   87  0.05 -0.01  -0.09 669
46 -0.02  -0.20*  0.28**  1669   88  -0.01 -0.05  0.00 3129
47 -0.23**  0.36**  -0.07 1212   89  -0.03 0.20  -0.08 426
48 -0.22*  0.10 -0.04 696   90  -0.15* 0.06  -0.02 1535
49 -0.42*  1.04**  -0.30* 129   91  0.23* -0.22  -0.02 964
Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. N gives the number of unique establishments used to calculate 
the within estimator. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 
1%. All specifications include establishment fixed effects and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 
1987). Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and trade data described in Section 4.   32
Table A9: Clustered robust errors 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10       50  0.26 -0.33  0.27 142
11 -1.81  -0.45  2.47  114   51  -0.54 0.25  0.29 640
12 -0.27  -0.05  0.31  119   52 17.43* 1.72**  -19.47* 146
13 0.07  0.01  -0.08  865   53  1.16 0.48* -1.66 194
14 -0.66  0.13  0.66  769   54  -0.73 0.27  0.63 393
15 -0.16  0.23  0.09  390   55  -0.27 0.38 -0.10 198
16        56  0.01 0.07  -0.01 526
17 0.08  -0.25*  0.03  175   57  -0.53** 0.70** -0.16 534
18 -0.02  -0.20  0.33  307   58  -0.09 -0.12  1.61** 42
19 0.04  0.13  -0.10  92   59  0.06 -0.42* 0.35 1168
20 -0.17  0.48*  -0.24  571   60  -0.40 0.05  0.35 435
21 0.18  0.06  -0.08  254   62 -0.06 0.13 -0.07 820
22 -0.11  -0.07  0.27  288   63  -0.23 0.63** -0.37 376
23        64  -0.82 0.29  0.73* 244
24 -0.09  0.19  0.13  482   65  0.08 -0.15  0.23 279
25 -0.09  0.03  0.17  204   66  0.44 -0.42 0.37* 106
26 0.06  -0.06  -0.08  123   67  0.07 0.11  -0.16* 3576
27 -0.26  -0.03  0.23  169   68  -0.03 0.16 -0.24 42
28 -0.50  0.49  0.38 87   69 -1.50* -0.23  2.02** 522
29 -0.04  -0.25  0.39  294   70  0.39 -0.39 -0.15 636
30 -0.67  0.20  0.17 65   71  0.31 -0.32  0.26 787
31 0.04  0.18  0.04  60   72  0.41 -0.53 -0.15 127
32 0.02  -0.04  0.09  334   73  0.86 -0.50 -0.53 193
33 0.36  -0.06  -0.09  553   75 -0.62 -0.44  1.00** 128
34 -0.07  0.25  -0.09  614   76  0.02 0.02  0.01 533
35 0.03  -0.18  0.44  299   77  0.13 0.02  -0.18* 2771
36 0.11  0.25  -0.18  398   78  0.22 -0.12 0.02 400
37 -0.11  0.35  -0.02  159   79  -0.04 0.35 -0.26 346
38 -0.05  -0.09  0.23  430   80  -0.26 0.28  0.11 482
39 -0.20  0.06  0.16  466   81         
40 -0.69**  0.46  0.52  65   82  -0.05 0.00  0.13 1028
41 -1.76  1.31  0.17  190   83  -0.22 0.25  0.06 1183
42 0.01  -0.05  -0.01  651   84  1.86 0.06 -1.89 2066
43 -0.44  -0.76  0.98 68   85  1.55 0.47 -1.96 260
44 -0.13  -0.10  0.21  1669   86  -0.67 0.16  0.57 683
45 -0.31  0.61*  -0.30  1279   87  0.05 -0.01 -0.09 669
46 -0.02  -0.20*  0.28**  1669   88  -0.01 -0.05  0.00 3129
47 -0.23  0.36*  -0.07  1212   89  -0.03 0.20 -0.08 426
48 -0.22  0.10  -0.04  696   90  -0.15 0.06 -0.02 1535
49 -0.42  1.04**  -0.30  129   91  0.23 -0.22 -0.02 964
Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. N gives the number of unique establishments used to calculate 
the within estimator. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for arbitrary within TTWA 
correlation. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All specifications include establishment fixed effects and time 
dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987). Source: Authors own calculations using ARD data and trade data 
described in Section 4. 
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Table A10: First difference estimator 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 0.51  -0.76  0.25  39   50 -0.08 0.04 0.10 142
11 -4.70  -3.47  7.20  114   51 -0.29* 0.23  0.10 640
12 -0.05  0.04  0.05  119   52  6.26* 0.02  -6.44* 146
13 -0.07  0.26*  -0.16  865   53  1.28 0.08 -1.24 194
14 -0.66  -0.04  0.69  769   54  0.40 0.08 -0.49 393
15 0.10  0.11  -0.32  390   55 -0.11 0.48 -0.44 198
16 -1.35  0.11  1.24 18   56  -0.08 0.57**  -0.60** 526
17 0.27  -0.24*  -0.02  175   57 -0.14 0.09 0.10 534
18 -0.10  0.12  0.04  307   58  -0.03 -0.20  0.76 42
19 -0.07  0.11  0.00 92   59 0.23** 0.24*  -0.48** 1168
20 -0.22  0.12  0.11  571   60 -0.67* -0.06 0.73* 435
21 0.23  -0.12  -0.03  254   62  0.01 -0.03 0.05 820
22 -0.47**  0.06  0.26**  288   63  -0.44 1.24  -0.84 376
23 0.15  -0.12  -0.02  25   64 -0.11 0.38 -0.04 244
24 -0.49**  0.30**  0.27**  482   65  -0.05 -0.24  0.31 279
25 0.14  -0.19  0.07  204   66  1.83 -2.01 0.89 106
26 -0.02  0.15  -0.16  123   67  0.07 -0.05  0.06 3576
27 -0.88*  -0.40**  0.97* 169   68  0.98 1.64  -2.75 42
28 -0.37  -0.01  0.28 87   69  -0.54 -0.02  0.67 522
29 -0.19  0.21  -0.06  294   70  0.06 0.04 -0.06 636
30 -0.30  -0.18  0.29 65   71  -0.30 -0.96*  1.09 787
31 -0.85  -0.19  0.88 60   72  0.76 -0.29 -0.43 127
32 -0.13*  0.22 -0.14 334   73 -1.56** 0.52 0.77** 193
33 -0.03  0.29  -0.19  553   75  0.04 -0.06  0.05 128
34 -0.15*  0.19** -0.06 614   76  -0.43 0.34  0.07 533
35 1.02  -0.27  -0.61  299   77  0.08 -0.08 0.01 2771
36 0.53  -0.70  0.07  398   78  0.06 0.28 -0.31 400
37 -0.03  -0.06  0.16  159   79  -0.44 1.29 -0.87 346
38 0.01  -0.11  0.07  430   80 -0.26 0.31 -0.03 482
39 -0.03  0.02  -0.01  466   81  -1.43 -1.33  2.70 21
40 -0.07  -0.13  0.22 65   82  0.03 -0.07  0.06 1028
41 0.51  0.30  -0.92  190   83 -0.08 0.10 -0.04 1183
42 0.00  -0.11  0.07  651   84  0.10 0.02 -0.09 2066
43 2.12  0.89  -2.98  68   85 -0.85 -0.23 1.10 260
44 0.03  -0.06  0.01  1669   86 -0.52 0.04 0.50 683
45 -0.09  0.21  -0.18  1279   87  0.44 -0.11 -0.34 669
46 0.00  0.03  -0.05  1669   88 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 3129
47 -0.06  0.14*  -0.07  1212   89  0.10 -0.02 -0.02 426
48 -0.04  -0.05  0.11  696   90  0.03 -0.09  0.07 1535
49 -0.46**  0.57*  -0.10  129   91  0.44** -0.52*  0.16 964
Notes: The dependent variable is returned employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, see table A2 
in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on export market 
access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. N gives the number of unique establishments used to calculate 
the first difference estimator. * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All specifications include establishment fixed 
effects and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987). Source: Authors own calculations using ARD 
data and trade data described in Section 4.  34
Table A11: Long differences 
IO  IMP EXP INT  N   IO IMP EXP  INT  N 
10 -0.11  0.78  -0.21 18   50  -0.22 -0.54 0.96* 30
11 -0.19  -0.05  1.01 41   51  0.00 0.08  0.02 144
12 0.02  -0.21  0.14  40   52 -2.07 2.53 -0.99 16
13 0.03  0.06  -0.07  204   53  0.64 1.36 -2.00 15
14 -0.11  0.11  0.14  142   54  0.01 -0.10  0.21 101
15 -1.11*  0.41  0.97 117   55  0.08 -0.05  0.20 57
16         56  0.08 -0.04  0.02 106
17 0.03  -0.10  -0.18  73   57 -0.13 0.03 0.33 98
18 0.16  -0.08  0.26  97   58 -0.81 0.85 0.69 13
19 -0.14  0.10  0.18 24   59  -0.06 -0.08  0.12 303
20 -0.06  -0.03  0.17  134   60  -0.33 0.25  0.14 141
21 0.26  0.05  -0.18  70   62 -0.08 0.04 0.07 192
22 -0.04  0.07  0.18  126   63  0.11 -0.04 -0.09 104
23         64  -0.47 0.29  0.38 58
24 -0.02  0.03  0.27  160   65  0.23 -0.18  0.18 101
25 0.01  0.45  -0.31  64   66  0.25 -0.50  0.63* 32
26 -0.06  -0.11  -0.02 35   67  0.02 -0.01  0.03 798
27 -0.24  0.36  -0.20 63      
28 -1.07**  1.39**  0.18  31   69  -0.07 0.53  -0.15 114
29 0.14  -0.29  0.44  76   70 -0.56 0.80 -0.57 181
30 -0.39  0.53  -0.10 24   71  0.07 0.22  0.11 211
31 0.39  0.45  -0.28  17   72  0.85 0.43  -1.49* 35
32 -0.02  -0.02  0.14 99   73  0.30 -0.42 -0.33 38
33 0.46  -0.44  0.06  137   75 -0.15 -0.32  0.60* 32
34 0.11  -0.10  0.14  179   76  0.56** -0.43  -0.32** 139
35 -0.01  -0.03  0.15 90   77  0.02 0.04 -0.02 541
36 -0.07  0.08  0.12  111   78  0.33 0.00 -0.22 151
37 -0.91  1.09  0.02 29   79 -0.61* 0.77**  0.21 81
38 0.46  -0.47  -0.03  107   80  -1.31** 1.22** 0.10 148
39 -0.20  0.06  0.17  166   81  0.26 -0.84 -0.50 11
40 -0.95*  1.69** -0.30  18   82  -0.72* 0.72*  0.03 236
41 -1.06  1.25  -0.21 39   83  -0.16 0.15 0.24* 257
42 0.15  -0.08  -0.17  164   84 -0.04 -0.04 0.16 517
43 0.30  0.27  -1.06  15   85  0.40** -0.29 -0.25 95
44 -0.25**  0.21*  0.03  411   86  0.03 -0.08  0.07 262
45 -0.24**  0.30**  0.06  255   87  -0.03 -0.06  0.02 210
46 -0.08  0.13  -0.03  311   88  0.04 -0.10 -0.01 890
47 -0.13  0.08  0.16  306   89  0.16 0.07 -0.02 135
48 -0.08  0.15  -0.19  171   90  -0.05 -0.05  0.00 330
49 -0.54  1.16*  -0.17 32   91  -0.07 -0.06  0.04 216
Notes: The dependent variable is returned or selected employment at the establishment level. IO gives the IO sector number, 
see table A2 in the appendix for sector names. IMP reports the coefficient on import competition, EXP the coefficient on 
export market access and INT the coefficient on access to intermediate inputs. N gives the number of unique establishments 
used to calculate the long difference estimator (long differences are the based on average employment 1984-1986 minus 
average employment 1970-1972). * denotes significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. All specifications include establishment 
fixed effects and time dummies. Data is for 1970-1992 (excluding 1983 and 1987). Source: Authors own calculations using 
ARD data and trade data described in Section 4. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
 
587  Pierre-Philippe Combes 
Henry G. Overman 
The Spatial Distribution of Economic Activities in the 
European Union 
     
586  Henry G. Overman  Can We Learn Anything from Economic Geography 
Proper? 
     
585  A. B. Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
P. K. Schott 
Falling Trade Costs, Heterogeneous Firms and 
Industry Dynamics 
     
584  A. B. Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
P. K. Schott 
Survival of the Best Fit:  Exposure to Low-Wage 
Countries and the (Uneven) Growth of U.S. 
Manufacturing Plants 
     
583  S. Wood 
S. Moore 
Reviewing the Statutory Union Recognition (ERA 
1999) 
     
582  T. Kirchmaier  Corporate Restructuring and Firm Performance of 
British and German Non-Financial Firms 
     
581  C. Dougherty  Why Is the Rate of Return to Schooling Higher for 
Women than for Men? 
     
580  S. Burgess 
D. Mawson 
Aggregate Growth and the Efficiency of Labour 
Reallocation 
     
579  S. Nickell  Poverty and Worklessness in Britain 
     
578  D. Marsden  Renegotiating Performance:  the Role of Performance 
Pay in Renegotiating the Effort Bargain 
     
577  S. Nickell  A Picture of European Unemployment:  Success and 
Failure 
     
576  A. de Coulon 
M. Piracha 
Self-Selection and the Performance of Return 
Migrants:  the Source Country Perspective 
     
575  H. Steedman 
K. Wagner 
J. Foreman 
The Impact on Firms of ICT Skill-Supply Strategies:  
An Anglo-German Comparison 
     574  S. Gibbons  The Costs of Urban Property Crime 
     
573  R. Griffith 
S. Redding 
H. Simpson 
Productivity Convergence and Foreign Ownership at 
the Establishment Level 
     
572  S. Redding 
P. K. Schott 
Distance, Skill Deepening and Development:  Will 
Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich? 
     
571  B. Petrongolo 
C. A. Pissarides 
Scale Effects in Markets with Search 
     
570  M. Coles 
B. Petrongolo 
A Test Between Unemployment Theories Using 
Matching Data 
     
569  A. Bryson 
L. Cappellari 
C. Lucifora 
Does Union Membership Really Reduce Job 
Satisfaction? 
     
568  A. Bryson 
R. Gomez 
Segmentation, Switching Costs and the Demand for 
Unionization in Britain 
     
567  M. Gutiérrez-Domènech  Employment After Motherhood:  A European 
Comparison 
     
566  T. Kirchmaier  The Performance Effects of European Demergers 
     
565  P. Lopez-Garcia  Labour Market Performance and Start-Up Costs: 
OECD Evidence 
564  A. Manning  The Real Thin Theory:  Monopsony in Modern 
Labour Markets 
563  D. Quah  Digital Goods and the New Economy 
     
562  H. Gospel 
P. Willman 
High Performance Workplaces:  the Role of 
Employee Involvement in a Modern Economy.  
Evidence on the EU Directive Establishing a General 
Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees 
     
561  L. R. Ngai  Barriers and the Transition to Modern Growth 
 
To order a discussion paper, please contact the Publications Unit 
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7595     Email  info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk 